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THE PANAMA CANAL EXPANSION:
ADAPTATION OF CONTRACTS

By
Augusto Garcia Sanjur*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Expansion of the Panama Canal is the biggest engineer project of the twentyfirst century. In the project of expansion that initiated in 2009 and finalized in 2016, there
were difficulties (notwithstanding the detailed construction contract tailored for the
specifics of the Canal) of supervening events had produced the renegotiations and current
arbitrations that in total are quantified in billions of dollars.
Using this mega-project as a contractual experience has shown that the adaptation
of contracts due to supervening events remains one of the most controversial topics in
international contracts because the rendezvous between the legal principles pacta sunt
servanda and rebus sic stantibus1 produced the conflict in the correspondent assumption
of risk for these occurrences.
This article will address the background of the history of the construction of the
Panama Canal, its expansion’s impact for the world trade, the resolution of dispute
mechanism adapted to the needs of the Panama Canal, the disputes regarding the
Expansion, comparing it with different previous awards and judgments to determine which
of the principles mentioned above is the trend in the international contracts resolution of
disputes.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. History of the construction of the Panama Canal
The twenty-first century has Elon Musk; the nineteenth Century had Ferdinand De
Lesseps. The French visionary, considered the creator of the Suez Canal in Egypt, had in
mind a Canal in Central America that could expedite travel from west to east. After
convincing the investors, the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique de Panama
started working in 1880 with a projected cost of US$120 million. However, due to
problems of administration (wrong use of the shareholders’ investments) and a huge
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Pacta sunt servanda is the legal principle which indicates that contracts are the law between the parties and
should be executed according to what the parties agreed to. On the other side, rebus sic stantibus is the legal
principle that indicates that when an unforeseeable event makes the contract excessively onerous for one
party, the disadvantaged party has the right to terminate the contract, and sometimes ask for renegotiations.
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propagation of malaria and yellow fever (due to the environmental condition of the place),
the French Canal failed.
Watching with precaution the construction of the French Canal, there was the
United States which also had in mind the construction of a Canal in Central America to be
able to get a more efficient way to transport the products from the West coast to the East
coast and vice versa. At this time, a French businessman called Phillipe Bunau-Varilla
began discussions with businessmen and authorities from Washington. The conversations
in Washington about changing the place to build the canal from Nicaragua to Panama was
still in debate. Then, the American Congress decided that the place where the Canal was
going to be built was Panama, instead of Nicaragua.
The American government paid US$40 million to acquire the shares of the French
company to build the Canal, but the Colombian authorities did not want to have the
Americans building the Canal without any consideration in return. However, after certain
failed negotiations with the Colombian authorities, the American government refused to
keep negotiating with them. At this moment, in Panama, which was part of Colombia, there
was an independence movement. Philippe Bunau-Varilla saw the perfect opportunity for
the independence of Panama from Colombia in order to allow the Americans to build the
Canal without the approval of the Colombians.
Panama gained independence on November 3, 1903. Three days later the United
States became the first nation to recognize Panama as an independent nation. In exchange
for his work, Phillipe Bunau-Varilla requested to be appointed by the provisional
government of Panama as Ministry Plenipotentiary. He was then appointed on November
6, 1903. On November 18, 1903, in an act that was criticized by President Manual Amador
Guerrero and the Panamanian authorities, Bunau-Varilla signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
treaty with the American Secretary of State, John Hay. This treaty recognized the Panama
Canal building site and its surroundings as property of the United States, gave the New
Panama Canal Company (an American entity) a monopoly on construction, and provided
Panama US$10 million and an annual payment of US$250,000.
Subsequently, the New Panama Canal Company started the work where the French
left it. The US company had the required technology to build this project, but its biggest
obstacle was in a petite insect which produced a lethal disease - yellow fever. In response,
the brilliant Dr. Gorgas discovered the way to eliminate the reproduction of the mosquito.
With this problem solved, the construction was unstoppable. The Panama Canal was
inaugurated on August 15, 1914. Unfortunately, because of the start of the World War I,
this event did not have the media impact that it meant to have.
B. Change from American to Panamanian administration
During the decades of the sixties and seventies, there was a trend in the international
community regarding the decolonization of the small countries from the powerful
countries, and Panama was not the exception. After January 9, 1964 incidents2, the
2

In the incidents of January 9, 1964, a group of Panamanian school students went to the Balboa High School
in the Canal Zone to raise the Panamanian flag jointly with the American. However, the act provoked tensions
and fights that resulted in the Panamanian flag being torn. Then, the students were chased by the American
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international community pressured the United States to give the Canal Zone back to
Panama. This movement produced the Torrijos-Carter Treaty in 1977, where the United
States agreed to give Panama the Canal Zone and the administration of the Panama Canal
on December 31, 1999.
After control passed to Panamanian administration, the Constitution of Panama was
modified to add Title XIV to address the Panama Canal territory and to create the Autoridad
del Canal de Panamá (ACP, Panama Canal Administration).
Between 2000 and 2006, the previous Panamax size3 was not enough for the
requirements of world trade. At this time, some of the Panama Canal’s clients started using
other routes, like the Suez Canal, to be able to transport bigger ships. In light of these facts,
the Panama Canal Administration considered a possible expansion and the creation of the
Third set of Locks. The expansion was approved by a national referendum on October 22,
2006.

III.

THE EXPANSION
A. The bidding process

The most important part of the Expansion4 was the design and construction of the
Third Set of Locks, which will be the focus in this article. The creation of the third set of
locks had four bidders. On August 11, 2009, Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC or the
Contractor) won the bid. This consortium was composed of the following companies: Sacyr
(Spain), Salini Impregilo (Italy), Jan de Nul (Belgium), and Constructora Urbana
(Panama). Its proposal was the more economical, offering the price of US$3.11billion,
which was below the price offered by the ACP of US$3.48 billion. Also, it had the highest

police which were armed with guns. Several Panamanian groups joined the fight, which resulted in 21
Panamanians and 4 Americans dead.
3

Panamax and New Panamax, MARINE CONNECTOR, http://maritime-connector.com/wiki/panamax/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2019) (Panamax are the mid-sized cargo ships that are capable of passing through the
lock chambers of the Panama Canal, which are 1,050 ft (320.04 m) in length, 110 ft (33.53 m) in width, and
41.2 ft (12.56 m) in depth).
4

International Financial Institutions Visit the Panama Canal Expansion, CANAL DE PANAMÁ,
https://micanaldepanama.com/expansion/2016/03/international-financial-institutions-visit-the-panamacanal-expansion/#prettyPhoto (last visited Mar. 25, 2019) (in 2008, the cost for the total Expansion of the
Panama Canal was projected as US$5.25 billion. ACP invested US$2.95 billion from its operations and the
rest US$2.30 billion was financed by five institutions, as wit: Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC) – US$800 million, European Investment Bank (EIB) – US$500 million, Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) – US$400 million, International Financing Corporation (IFC) – US$300 million, Development
Bank of Latin America (CAF) – US$300 million. These loans were approved without any collateral in behalf
of the Panama Canal Administration, they were approved based on the trust and the positive credit rate of the
Panama Canal. This funding, agreed to 20 years with a ten-year grace period, stipulating that creditors will
not intervene in the management or operation of the Canal and will not affect the Canal´s contributions to the
National Treasury, as established by Law 28 of 2006 which approved the Expansion Program).
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score in the technical evaluation.5 Work started on August 25, 2009 with a projected end
date in October, 2014.
B. The Contract
The Contract for the design and construction of the Third Set of Locks (“the
Contract”) was based on the Yellow Book template of the Féderation Internationale des
Ingénierus-Conseils (FIDIC6, the International Federation of Consulting Engineers).
FIDIC is an international organization founded in Belgium in 1913. Since 1957, when its
first standard form called the Red Book was released, it has been the pre-eminent
international organization in offering standard forms of contracts in the international
construction market.7
The Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build for Electrical and
Mechanical Works and for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Contractor,8
also called Yellow Book, is the standard form used by a contractor to create a contract with
the employer’s requirements for the works.9 The payment mechanism provided in the
Yellow Book is regulated in sub-clause 4.1., “[W]here the Contractor accepts a fitness-forpurpose obligation for the design of the works, as well as for materials and workmanship.
The payment mechanism for the Yellow Book is lump sum fixed price,10 with provision
for progress payments on the basis of Engineer certification.” The Yellow Book is an

5

The consortium earned 4.088,5 points in the technical proposal (over a total of 5.500) and obtaining a total
of 8.088,5 total points. Contract Officer's Report on the evaluation process of the Technical Proposals, July
2009 https://micanaldepanama.com/ampliacion/documentos/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). See also Francisco
L. Hernández González, La Problemática del Restablecimiento del Equilibrio Económico en la Contratación
Pública Internacional: La Crisis de la Ampliación del Canal de Panamá, 194, REVISTA DE
ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA Revista 475, 481 (2014).
6

Aisha Nadar, The Contract: The Foundation of Construction Projects in the Guide to Construction
Arbitration, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV 7, 15 (2017) (there are also another international professional
associations that offer standard forms, such as: the Institution of Civil Engineers; the Institute of Chemical
Engineers; the Joint Contracts Tribunal; the Engineering Advancement Association of Japan; the Civil
Engineering Contractors Association; the AIA; and the Design Build Institute of America (DBIA)).
7

Ellis Baker and Anthony Lavers, Introduction to the FIDIC Suite of Contracts in The Guide to Construction
Arbitration, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV 38, 50 (2017).
8

While the Red Book standard form is used when the design is made by the Employer.

9

Irene Nuviala Lapieza, The Expansion of the Panama Canal and its Ruling International Contract: A MegaProject Sailing in Troubled Waters? 33 REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES
1, 13 (2017).
See Nadar, supra note 6, at 11 (“Fixed-price or lump sum contracts are contracts where the contractor is
paid a pre-agreed sum of money when he or she has successfully performed all of his or her obligations under
the contract. The contract sum is determined and specified in the contract agreement. Payment is made in
pre-determined stages and the contractor assumes the risk for both performance and price.”).
10
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efficient industry standard, which allows parties to create a contract with certainty and
predictability. Based on the principle of autonomy of the parties, they can amend this
contract and tailor it according to the needs of the specific circumstances. As FIDIC
implements international contracts, they provide for arbitration as the mechanism for the
resolution of disputes.11 Thus, to understand the issue of adaptation in case of hardship,
this article will analyze the interaction between clause 13 (Right to Vary), clause 19 (Force
Majeure clause), clause 17 (Risk Allocation), sub-clause 4.12 (unforeseeable physical
conditions), and clause 20 (Resolution of Disputes clause).
1. Right to Vary
The Adjustment Clause in the Panama Canal Contract is contained in clause 13,
with the name of Variations and Adjustments.12 The Right to Vary starts with the
employer’s representative, who may initiate the variation13 with or without14 first request
of the Contractor. The Contractor will be bound by it unless it gives notice to the
employer’s representative. After receiving this notice, the employer’s representative shall
cancel, confirm, or modify the instruction.15
The variation procedure provides that if the employer’s representative sends a
proposal prior to a variation, the Contractor shall respond as soon as practicable by
accepting it or submitting comments, recommendations, or changes to the proposal
(including suggestions for adjustment of the Contract price). Then, the employer’s
representative shall respond by either approving, disapproving, or giving comments. It is
11

Jane Jenkins & Kim Rosenberg, Engineering and Construction Arbitration, in ARBITRATION IN
ENGLAND, WITH CHAPTERS ON SCOTLAND AND IRELAND162-163 (Julian D. M. Lew, Harris Bor
, et al. eds., [X ed.] 2013)..).
12

WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 231 (X et al. eds,. X ed. 1986) (This is an example of clauses where the
parties between themselves have formulas to be able to adapt the Price of the contract if it is required by the
circumstances without requesting a tribunal to modify the contract. As was recognized by one scholar. “The
parties may continually transform or operationally adapt their relationship to new circumstances and
technical difficulties without any legal or contractual modification.”).
13

See Jenkins, supra note 11, at 166. (variations or change of orders are changes of the scope of works
ordered by the owner or agreed with the contractor).
See PETER, supra note 12, at 234 (If the Employer’s Representative confirms and modifies the variation
without the consent of the Contractor. It will work as a unilateral adaptation clause, which is used in the
FIDIC contracts for purposes of efficiency in long term constructions contracts. “Under the FIDIC Civil
Engineering Contract, the engineer is allowed to change or “vary” the works. Even if the FIDIC clause allows
changes, the engineer's power to change the works is not unlimited. Accordingly, the engineer, acting as the
employer's agent, can “avoid the need for renegotiations with the contractor each time a change becomes
necessary or desirable.””).””.
14

15

Variation Orders, MICANAL DE PANAMA (last visited March 31, 2019) (available at
https://micanaldepanama.com/expansion/documents/variations/) (on March 31, 2019, the contract has 197
Variation Orders).
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important to highlight the fact that, while awaiting a response, the Contractor shall not
delay any work that is not subject to the proposal. Once a variation is confirmed by the
employer’s representative or through an agreement, such a variation enters into force.
The Contract also provides for the payment due to additional costs in a daywork
basis. The Contractor must send a quote to the employer’s representative with the cost to
perform and basic salaries of personnel.16 After the work, it must send invoices of the
expenses to the employer’s representative (who shall include them in the next Interim
Payment). Additionally, the Contract provides for adjustments due to changes in
legislation. The Contractor will not be entitled to variations if it, while exercising Prudent
Industry Practices,17 ought to have reasonably foreseen such increases in cost or time.
Also, the Contract provides for an adjustment related to changes in prices of
specified materials. It indicates that the Contract price shall be increased or decreased
during the course of the Contract following the adjustment price changes of reinforcing
steel, lock gate, and diesel fuel.18 This price adjustment contains a ceiling called the
Maximum Adjustment Quantity.19

2. Force Majeure
Clause 19 defines force majeure as an exceptional event or circumstance: (a) which
is beyond a Party’s control; (b) which such Party could not reasonably have provided
against before entering into the Contract; (c) which, having arisen, such a Party could not
reasonably have avoided or overcome; and (d) which is not substantially attributable to the
other Party. Some events characterized as force majeure, if they fulfill the elements, are
the following: war, hostilities, rebellion, terrorism, and natural catastrophes such as
earthquake and hurricane. It also includes the munitions of war, explosive materials, except
as attributable to the Contractor’s use of such munitions, explosives, radiation or radioactivity, which will be at the risk of the Contractor because it could reasonably be avoided
16

Wilfredo Jordan, Eduardo Mendoza, Demand Made to Finish Canal Expansion La Prensa, (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.prensa.com/in_english/Canal_21_4385021455.html (On November 2012, DAB recognized
US$17.7 million due to the increase of the cost of the workforce. Originally, GUPC requested US$31.4
million.).
In sub-clause 1.1.5.25, the Contract defines “Prudent Industry Practices” as means using the standards,
practices, methods and procedures, complying with Laws and exercising the degree of prudence and foresight
which would be expected from a properly skilled and experienced international market leading EPC
contractor in the international civil engineering and infrastructure sector.
17

The adjustment indexes present in the Contract for this materials are: (a) Reinforcing Steel: “Platts Steel
Markets Daily”, “Reinforcing Bar”, “Ex-Works, US SE”, “Close/Midpoint” Price, in US $ per short ton; (b)
Lock Gate, Valve, and Bulkhead Structural Steel Plate and Shapes: “Platts Steel Markets Daily”, “Plate”,
“Ex-Works, US SE”, Close/Midpoint” Price, in US $ per short ton; and (c) Diesel Fuel: “Platts Latin
American Wire”, “Gulf Diesel (No. 2 Oil)”, Closing Price, in US $ per US gallon.
18

The sub-clause 1.1.5.18 of the Panama Canal Contract provides that “Maximum Adjustment Quantity”
means in respect of each Specified Material the maximum adjustment quantity as stated in the Price
Adjustment Timetable.
19

95

or overcome with the right use and the principle that self-induced force majeure is not
valid.
If as a consequence of the event, a party will be prevented from performing its
obligations, temporarily or permanently, notification has to be given to the other party
within 14 days after the party became aware or should have become aware, of the
circumstance constituting force majeure. The consequence of the force majeure is the
excuse of performance of the obligations as long as the events prevent it from being
performed. Also, with due regard to the dispute resolution mechanism, the Contractor may
request an extension of time for such delay caused by the force majeure, and it can request
the costs incurred due to the event. If the force majeure substantially affects the work for
120 days or multiple periods which total more than 200 days, either party may request the
termination of the Contract with payment due for the work that has been carried out.
For instance, this clause was applied in 2012 when in the province of Colon,
protests and riots occurred due to the disagreement of the population when the government
imposed a law affecting the free zone of the province. GUPC made a claim to the DAB in
the amount of US$16.4 million and the DAB recognized US$6.2 million in favor of GUPC.
Additionally, in a case involving the strikes of the union called Suntracs from April
23, 2014 to May 7, 2014, GUPC claimed the amount of US$28.6 million and the DAB
recognized US$11.2 million. 20

3. Risk allocation
Clause 17 establishes that the events that caused force majeure are in the burden of
the ACP.21 According to this clause, the risk passes from the Contractor to the ACP until
the Taking-Over Certificate is delivered. If any loss or damage happens to the works and
goods while the Contractor is responsible for their care, not caused by force majeure, the
Contractor shall rectify the loss or damage at its own risk and cost, so that the works, goods,
and Contractor’s documents be according to the requirements of the Contract.
This clause was applied in August 201522 when cracks appeared in the chamber of
Cocoli locks, a highly publicized event. According to the administrator of the Panama

20

Wilfredo Jordan, La DAB falla a favor de GUPC, aunque el monto es menos de lo que pedía a la ACP, La
Prensa,(Dic.31,2015)
https://www.prensa.com/economia/Junta-favor-GUPC-reconoceACP_0_4381811899.html
See Jenkins, supra note 11, at 164. “It is important to check the risk allocation for both time and costs for
each neutral event, i.e. weather delays. It is not uncommon for construction contracts to allocate the risk of
delays arising out of neutral events to the owner, but the risk of additional costs arising out of these events to
the contractor. For example, under the JCT Standard Form of Building Contract, 2005 ed., the contractor is
entitled to an extension of time for inclement weather conditions as a ‘Relevant Event’, but not compensation
for any additional costs arising from that event.”
21

22

Michele Labrut, Repairs to Panama Canal cracks to be completed in January 2016, SeaTrade Maritime
News (Dec. 2, 2015) http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/americas/repairs-to-panama-canal-cracks-tobe-completed-in-january-2016.html?highlight=Imd1cGMi, (last visited March 25, 2019).
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Canal, Jorge Luis Quijano, the cost for the repairs was US$40 million, and it was a problem
with the designer of locks.23 The Contractor was responsible for the repairs of the locks
and reinforced the sills with steel in the three chambers of both locks Agua Clara (Atlantic)
and Cocoli (Pacific).
Interestingly, this Contract does not have a hardship clause (explained and
discussed below) subject to maintaining the economic equilibrium of the parties. The
Contract provides for an adjustment clause and a force majeure clause, but in the subclause 17.6 of risk allocation it expressly provides that neither party shall be liable to the
other party for loss of use of any works, loss of profit, loss of any contract, or for any
indirect or consequential loss or damage which may be suffered by the other party in
connection with the Contract. . . . Therefore, in this Contract there is a limitation of liability,
and it rejects the principle of restoring the economic equilibrium according to the risk
allocation of the Contract.
ICC case no. 18,806 (decided in 2016, seated in London, between Konoike
Construction Co. Limited (claimant) v. The Ministry of Works of Tanzania et al.
(respondents) involving the design and construction of the upgrade of the DodomaManyoni Road) regarded the allocation of risks where the contract was based in the FIDIC
Yellow Book design and build contract.24 On November 15, 2002, the Tanzania Ministry
of Works invited tenders for the project.25 On 2003, Konoike won the bid.26
In the arbitration, Konoike had several delays and disruption claims where the
unforeseeability and risk allocation of these risks were discussed.
In a claim based on cement shortage, the claimant alleged that there was a national
shortage of cement in Tanzania in the second half of November and December 2007 caused
by the introduction of import tariffs by Tanzania.27 On the other hand, Respondent argued
that the shortage of cement was the claimant’s risk.28 Tanzania indicated that the event was
not unforeseeable and that claimant could have avoided or overcome the event by paying
higher market prices or sourcing cement from abroad.29 Based on a Tanzanian case decided
in 1983, respondent indicated that the shortage of building materials in Tanzania was a

23

Wilfredo Jordan, GUPC ha cobrado $4,235 millones , La Prensa, (Jan. 25, 2015),
https://impresa.prensa.com/panorama/GUPC-cobrado-millones_0_4377312227.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2019)
24

Konoike Construction Co. Limited v. The Ministry of Works of Tanzania et al. ICC case no. 18806, 24
(2016).
25

Id.

26

Id. at 23.

27

Id. at 127.

28

Konoike Construction Co. Limited v. The Ministry of Works of Tanzania et al. ICC case no. 18806, 128
(2016).
29

Id.
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notorious fact.30 Claimant submitted that the conditions from 1986 have changed due to a
liberalization of the economy, easing of import restrictions, and opening of two cement
plants increased the availability of cement in Tanzania.31 In this claim, the tribunal
concluded that it was an inability from the cement manufacturer due to problems with a
clinker machine.32 Therefore, the tribunal indicated that where at least a substantial cause
of the cement shortage arose from the manufacturer’s plant break down. Moreover, the
tribunal was not able to conclude if Tanzanian government had any effect in the shortage
of cement.33

4. Unforeseeable Physical Conditions
Sub-clause 4.12 of the Contract expresses and numbers different site conditions or
unforeseeable physical conditions that are the burden of the employer. Unforeseeable is
defined in sub-clause 1.1.6.42 as “not reasonably foreseeable by a Contractor exercising
Prudent Industry Practices by the date established for submission of Tenders.”
Additionally, “the physical conditions mean natural physical conditions, including subsurface and hydro-geologic conditions but excluding climatic conditions and man-made
and other physical obstructions and pollutants.” If the Contractor finds: (1) unforeseeable
and different physical conditions from those described by the Employer in the descriptive
documents, such as the geotechnical interpretative report and the topographical data; and
(2) the circumstance is included in the list of circumstances provided in the clause, then the
Contractor shall send the information to the employer’s representative, describing the
material changes and demonstrating that the condition was unforeseeable.
The Contractor has an obligation to keep performing the works provided in the
Contract while the claims are being resolved. Moreover, the clause has a provision limiting
the scope of the unforeseeable circumstances to those numbered in the clause. This clause
expresses the conditions that are the burden of the Employer. Therefore, the issue arises
when an unforeseeable circumstance causes the fundamental alteration of the equilibrium
of the contract by an excessive increase in the onerousness of the contract. Can the tribunal
modify the terms of the contract based on hardship?

30

Id.

31

Id. at 129.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 130.
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5.

Resolution of disputes

Clause 20 provides for three tiers in which the claims will be resolved. First, the
claim is submitted to the employer’s representative, who will analyze the merits of the
claim. Second, in the case that the Contractor does not agree with the decision of the
employer’s representative, the claim must be filed before the Dispute Adjudication Board
(DAB), which will render a binding decision on the parties. Finally, if during the period of
28 days after the notification of the decision, a party disagrees with the decision, the third
tier will apply - the final resolution by arbitration.
a. Renegotiations through the employer’s representative
The Contractor has a term of 28 days from when it knew or ought to have known
about the event or circumstance to notify the employer’s representative. In the case that the
event has continuing effect, the Contractor must report this situation on a monthly basis
and will have 28 days after the ending of the effect to present the final claim. The
employer’s representative is a specialized engineering professional with duties to include
supervising the execution of the works by the Contractor to make certain that the works
have been done according to the employer’s requirements. The employer’s representative
is an agent of the ACP appointed to approve or disapprove internally the claims presented
by the Contractor. In this regard, “it is precisely as the name implies, the representative of
the employer for the purposes of the contract.”34
Hence, the Engineer is not a party to the construction contract. The Engineer’s
contractual relation is with the Employer; through this contract it acquires supervisory
obligations to the Employer.35 In the FIDIC terms, the Contractor must first address the
34

Scott Stiegler, Parties to a Construction Contract, The Guide to Construction Arbitration, 18, 23 (2017)
(Stavros Brekoulakis and David Brynmor Thomas eds.) “The role of the Employer’s Representative, while
it is position held by an individual, is usually developed in a team which has been related to the project from
the tender process to the development of the works.”
35

Sigvard Jarvin, Yves Derains and Jean-Jacques Arnaldez. ICC case No. 4416, Collection of ICC Arbitral
Awards 1986-1990, 460-464 (Kluwer International 1994)., 1985. Reported by Sigvard Jarvin. (In a case
which involved a European construction company acting as claimant and an African state corporation acting
as respondent. In 1975, the parties agreed for a contract for the construction of public utilities, in this contract
they provided for an independent engineer appointed by the owner. Later, in 1977 the independent engineer
appointed by the owner was removed by the employer, with no replacement. The employer indicated that its
own staff will handle the matter by itself. The contractor rejected this decision, but the owner did not appoint
a replacement. The contract provided for the clause 52 (5) of the FIDIC conditions which requested that if
the contractor may consider it entitled for additional payment it should send to the engineer the new accounts
in a monthly manner. The question before the arbitral tribunal was whether because the owner did not appoint
an independent engineer, the contractor may file the claim directly in arbitration. The tribunal indicated that:
“A strict interpretation of the contract was excluded because of the deviations from the contract which the
parties themselves, explicitly or implicitly, had undertaken.” The tribunal also indicated that the role of the
engineer can be performed by an employer’s agent or employee. The tribunal is not going to consider the
professional capability and integrity of the appointed engineer. However, the tribunal indicated that the own
staff of the respondent did not have this institutional role and this provoked an ex parte procedural frustration
provoked by the respondent, and this factor authorizes the respondent to file the claim directly by arbitration.).

99

complaint to the employer’s representative.36 For this position, the ACP appointed Mr.
Jorge de La Guardia.37 The employer’s representative must request proof from the
Contractor of the existence and impact of the event in question and will have 42 days to
render a decision. If the Contractor disagrees with the decision, the next step is the
resolution of the dispute by the Dispute Adjudicatory Board (DAB).

b. Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB)
The Dispute Adjudication Board is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism
designed for construction projects where the members reach a decision that may become
binding for the parties. In this regard, the DABs are tailored for big construction projects
because they allow the parties to continue the works while the DAB is making the
resolution of the dispute in an expeditious and efficient way. This continuance of
performance is supported by the text of sub-clause 20.4 of the Contract, which establishes
that “at all times unless the Contract has already been abandoned, repudiated or the
Contract has been terminated or the Contractor's right to complete the Contract has been
terminated, the Contractor shall continue to proceed with the Works in accordance with the
Contract.” This continuance of performance coupled with the absence of strict formalisms,
like in the litigation or in arbitration, allow the mega-projects to obtain efficient justice in
a period when it is still useful instead of entering long and complex procedures that lose
the economic value for the parties.38
In the Contract, the parties agreed to a Board formed of three members - each party
appointed one, and these two appointed the chair. In the standard Yellow Book resolution
mechanism, the DAB is appointed as ad hoc39 for every difference that the parties have
36

Id. at 454, 454-459. ICC case No. 4589, 1984. (In this case involving a European contractor and an Middle
East employer, the contractor indicated that several delays which overruns the cost of the construction of an
hotel due to the fault of the employer in getting the custom documentation for the materials. The contractor
submitted a claim for extension of time and additional payments to the engineer, who in 1982 rejected the
claims. In January 1983 the contractor submitted a claim for arbitration in ICC Court of Arbitration
Secretariat in Paris. On 16 May, 1983 the contractor terminated the contract with effective date 30 May 1983.
On August 1983 it amended its claim adding totaling amounts in excess of the original claim. The employer
indicated that according to the contract, the contractor had to submit this claim first to the engineer, regardless
that the contract was terminated. M.M. Soumrani acting as sole arbitrator answered the question why should
a termination of the construction contract make the engineer functus officio? The sole arbitrator indicated
“that the contract relating to the project, the construction contract, may be repudiated by the Contractor
without necessarily affecting the Engineer’s authority to perform surviving duties and exercise remaining
rights laid down in the FIDIC conditions. As long as the appointment of the Engineer is notified to the
contractor, disputes must first be referred to him, and he must be prepared to examine new disputes after the
termination of the construction contract until the Employer decides to replace him or otherwise.”).
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Agenor Correa Pulice, La Naturaleza Jurídica y Misión de los Disputes Boards, Revista Métodos Alternos
de Solución de Conflictos en Panamá, 65, 65 (2016).
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during the project However, the parties modified this provision and agreed to appoint
permanent members of the DAB,40 to be able to obtain a more active and present role of
the DAB during the advances of the project. The members of the permanent DAB are Mr.
Pierre Genton (appointed by GUPC), Mr. Robert Smith (appointed by ACP), and Mr. Peter
H.J. Chapman (the chairman selected by the parties).41
The DAB shall be deemed not to be acting as arbitrators.42 Both parties shall make
available to the DAB all the necessary information.43 After the DAB has all the required
information, it has to render a decision within 84 days, which shall be reasoned under subclause 20.4.44 The DAB is not obliged to render a decision until it has been paid in full
(divided in the equivalent proportion by each party). According to the text of the Contract,
the decision of the DAB is binding unless and until it is revised by the parties in an amicable
settlement or in an arbitral award.45 The parties have a period of 28 days after the decision
has been rendered to notify the other party of its dissatisfaction with the decision. In
absence of this notification, the decision of the DAB will be final, binding, and
enforceable.46
The following is an example of the DAB’s decisions on December 31, 2014. GUPC
asked for damages of US$463 million and requested a 265 day extension. GUPC claimed
that the mixture of basalt, which is the main element of the concrete offered by the ACP,
was not of the same characteristics that were necessary for its use. When it proposed a
different mixture, the ACP approved it after an initial rejection. According to GUPC this
costed “overruns” for adjusting its cement processing plant and seeking alternative sources
of basalt.47 The permanent DAB rendered a decision awarding GUPC US$233 million plus
interest and 176 additional days to complete the project. However, regarding this dispute,
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Ryan Mellske, Grupo Unidos por el Canal v. Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, Dispute Adjudication Board
Decision, 31 December 2014, A contribution by the ITA Board of Reporters, 1 (Kluwer Law International
2015).
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on March 17, 2015, the ACP filed a claim48 before the next tier in the dispute resolution of
the Contract - arbitration seated in Miami and administered by the ICC.49

c. Arbitration50
The last and ultimate instance to resolve any dispute in this mega-project is
arbitration. Sub-clause 20.6 of the Contract contains the arbitration agreement. This clause
establishes: “(i) Unless settled amicably, any dispute in respect of which the DAB’s
decision (if any) has not become final and binding shall be finally settled by international
arbitration in law (within the meaning of Panamanian law).”51
The wording “any dispute” in this sub-clause is defined in sub-clause 20.4 and
establishes that “If a dispute (of any kind whatsoever) arises between the Parties in
connection with, or arising out of, the Contract or the execution of the Works, including
any dispute as to any certificate, determination, instruction, opinion or valuation of the
employer’s representative. . . .” The language “if a dispute (of any kind whatsoever)”
related to the contract, prima facie will appear as a broad concept in which everything
48

According to the Independent Financial Statement of 2015 of the ACP produced by Ernst & Young. The
ACP paid the US$233 million as the DAB decided, and then the ACP presented this claim to recover this
amount. This supports the fact that the DAB’s decisions are binding until they are reversed by the arbitral
tribunal. In this same arbitral process, GUPC is claiming a total of US$807,472,000 from the ACP.
Independent Auditors’ Report of Financial Statements to the Board of Directors of the Panama Canal (Sept.
30, 2015), https://www.pancanal.com/eng/general/fin-statements/FY-2015.pdf.
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After the notification of the no conforming letter. Sub-clause 20.5 of the Contract provides that the parties
shall attempt to settle the dispute amicably before the commencement of arbitration. However, the Contract
created there a presumption that the parties agree that after 56 days of the notification of the letter the
arbitration may be commenced, even if the parties have made no attempt at amicable settlement. In practical
matters, it has to be seen that in the first tier the parties already tried to negotiate, and they went to the DAB,
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In the different ICC arbitrations between GUPC and ACP the legal team of GUPC included White & Case
LLP (N.Y.C., United States), BonelliErede (Italy), Seyfarth Shaw (D.C., United States) and Alemán,
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related to the contract shall be submitted to arbitration. However, this was not the holding
in a case decided in 2017 by the High Court of Justice in England involving a dispute
related to the main Contract, where GUPC filed an application to stay the court proceedings
in London under §9 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996. 52
In this case, ACP (claimant) and the members of GUPC (defendant) agreed to new
guarantees for the repayment of the advance payments that the ACP made to GUPC in
2015. These new guarantees, called APG (advance payment guarantee) and JAPG (joint
advance payment guarantee), had an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favor of English courts
and a choice of law clause for English law.53
The main issue was to determine if GUPC was liable for the repayment of the
advance payments to ACP under the main Contract. The defendants argued Panamanian
law was the applicable law because the issue was subject to arbitration under the main
Contract and the arbitration clauses had Panamanian law as the applicable law.54 The court
denied the stay of proceedings due to the parties’ agreement in the APGs.55 In this regard,
the court agreed with the defendants that the repayment issue subjected to arbitration was
the most substantial issue arising under the APGs.56 However, the court applied the theory
“the substance of the controversy,”57 which indicated that the issue was whether the
defendants were liable to ACP under the English law APGs (within the exclusive
jurisdiction clause). Therefore, the court found that was not a matter that the parties agreed
to arbitrate.58
This is an example of how the parties may choose another forum or different
applicable laws to regulate and resolve the contract disputes that are related to the main
contract. In this case, even though the main Contract contains a broad arbitration agreement
and the dispute was related to it, the court based its decision on the agreement of the parties
52

Autoridad del Canal de Panamá v. Sacyr, S.A., Salini-Impregilo S.P.A., Jan De Nul, N.V., Constructora
Urbana S.A., Sofidra S.A., [2017] EWHC 2228 (Comm).
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ACP motion for summary judgment indicated that because of APG and JAPG, the members of GUPC were
principally responsible and that the advance repayments were upon demand. The court rejected this motion.
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[2017] EWHC 2228.

“There is no reason to take a different approach here. To hold otherwise and impose a mandatory stay
would run contrary to the substantive provisions of the contract, by which ACP is entitled to enforce the
security without enforcing any other security or the principal indebtedness itself.”[2017] EWHC 2228.
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“The essential nature of the claim here is that it is brought under guarantees (the APGs), which are subject
to English law and jurisdiction. The substance of the controversy between the parties is the claim under the
APGs, and that is the “matter” for the purposes of s. 9(1). The issue of the liability of the principal debtor to
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when they choose English law as the applicable law for the APGs.59 This is because the
choice of forum and choice of law clauses as the arbitration agreements are products of the
principle of autonomy of the parties.
The arbitration agreement also indicates that (ii) “The dispute shall be finally settled
under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce”.
As of September 30, 2018, the claims of GUPC amount to US$5.68 billion. In the
development of the Expansion of the Panama Canal there have been five arbitrations
administered by ICC (including the jointed ones). The cases that are still in dispute are the
second, third and fourth.
The first case, Pacific entrance Cofferdam Arbitration (ICC 19962/ASM), involved
a dispute over the Pacific Entrance Cofferdam. The arbitrators were Bernard Hanotiau
(President/Belgium), Bernardo Cremades (Spain) and Robert Gaitskill QC (UK).60 The
arbitration commenced in December 2013, and the final hearing was in January 2017.61
The decision was communicated on July 31, 2017. The amount claimed by GUPC was
US$194 million.62 The tribunal ruled in favor of ACP and ordered GUPC to pay US$23
million in legal costs.63
The second case, Concrete Arbitration (ICC 20910/ASM merged with ICC
20911/ASM), involves a dispute concerning the concrete and aggregates, on-site
laboratories and Pacific foundation.64 The arbitrators were Pierre-Yves Gunter
(President/Switzerland), Claus von Wobeser (Mexico) and Robert Gaitskill (UK).65 The
amount claimed by GUPC was US$807 million. The arbitration commenced in March
2015.66 Hearings on the merits were held January 2019 and February 2019.67 Before this
arbitration, the DAB ordered the ACP to pay US$233 million plus interest to GUPC. In the
arbitration, GUPC requested U$347 million more, while ACP claimed to recover the paid
US$244 million paid and additional US$264 million.
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Also, the ACP claimed delay damages for US$54 million due to the 182 day
delay. This tribunal faced an Emergency Application filed by GUPC.69 GUPC requested
that the tribunal issue an order directing ACP to agree to a revised timetable to defer any
repayment obligation after the conclusion of the arbitration, anticipated to last until 2022
(the letters of credit were valid until December 2018).70 Basically, GUPC requested the
tribunal prohibit the ACP from taking any action that could affect the status quo of the
parties until the disputes were settled.71 The arbitral tribunal in the Procedural Order No.
1, made on a prima facie basis, denied the claim.72
The third case, Locks Arbitration (ICC 22465/ASM/JPA), involves a dispute about
the lock gates and adjustment of labor costs.73 According to the Project Report of the ACP
“a mutual agreement by them is still pending to designate the President of the Arbitral
Tribunal to constitute such Arbitral Tribunal.” The amount requested by GUPC is US$506
million.74 Arbitration commenced on December 8, 2016. It is in an early stage.75 Also, it is
important to point out that the arbitrations 22465/ASM//JPA and the 22966/JPA were
jointed in this case.76
The fourth case is Disruption, Unforeseeable physical conditions and other claims
Arbitration (ICC 22466/ASM//JPA). It is in an early stage. The amount requested by
GUPC is US$4.34 billion.77 The ICC 22466/ASM//JPA was consolidated with the case
ICC 22967/JPA and filed in July 2017.78 This case was not decided in the 84 days that the
DAB had to render the decision (sub-clause 20.4) and GUPC filed the notice of
arbitration.79 According to the administration of the Panama Canal, the amount that GUPC
68
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is requesting will be enough to build a fourth set of locks.80 The contract price for the third
set of locks was US$3.11 billion.
The fifth case was Advance payments or Guarantee Arbitration. The arbitrators
were Gabrielle Kauffman-Kohler (President/Switzerland), Guido Tawill (Argentina) and
Stephan Furst QC (UK).81 GUPC requested declarations that repayments of the advance
payments were not due or payable under Panamanian law and the relevant agreements.82
There were US$548 million in advance payments secured by Letters of Credit with the
applicable law being Panamanian law.83 This matter was going to consider much of the
same points of the Emergency Arbitration.84 The proceedings commenced in January 2017,
and the decision was rendered on December 12, 2018.85
The ACP argued that GUPC did not follow the dispute resolution mechanism by
addressing this dispute directly to arbitration.86 The tribunal held that GUPC would have
to pay the ACP the initial advances, which amount to US$547 million (secured by three
letters of credit, subjected to Panamanian law and issued by two Panamanian institutions).87
GUPC will have to pay the ACP the additional advances of US$299 million secured
by corporate guarantees subjected to English law, producing a total of US$847 million.88
The ACP became entitled to collect the Guarantee issued by UniCredit AG (London) for
the interests of the advance payments in the amount of US$13 million.89 The tribunal also
held that the ACP was not authorized to withhold amounts payable to GUPC related to
maintenance services. GUPC must reimburse ACP US$395,000 in concept of costs and

Jorge Luis Quijano: ‘GUPC ha hecho reclamos muy superiores’, (Jan. 13,
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expenses of the tribunal members and the International Court of Arbitration of ICC.90
Finally, GUPC must pay ACP US$5 million as contribution of the legal costs and
expenses.91
The arbitration clause also indicates that (iii) “as an addition to the Rules the parties
agreed that the arbitration shall be conducted according to the International Bar Association
Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration”92 known as the
“IBA Rules.”
On this point, the document of the IBA Rules is an effort of the international
community to get uniformity, predictability, and guidance to the tribunal in how to deal
with situations of evidence, which can be problematic because of the many differences
between civil and common law in taking on evidence.93 Initially, the IBA Rules are not
binding, but they may be binding by virtue of the parties’ agreement,94 as in the Panama
Canal Contract.
Moreover, according to (iv), the dispute shall be settled by three arbitrators who
shall all be licensed lawyers appointed in accordance with the Rules; (v) the arbitration
shall be decided in law (within the meaning of Panamanian law) and shall be conducted in
the language for communications defined in sub-Clause 1.4,95 i.e. English. Also, the clause
provides in (vi) the venue of the arbitration shall be Miami, Florida, United States of
America.96 In this part, the terms “venue” and “seat” are used indistinctly. The selection of
the seat of arbitration is of fundamental importance in dealing with matters of setting aside
arbitral awards or annulling arbitration agreements.97
A prime example can be found in the case Grupo Unidos por el Canal, S.A. v.
Autoridad del Canal de Panama, where GUPC (claimant) filed a motion to vacate an
arbitral award rendered by the arbitral tribunal seated in Miami. This arbitral award was
issued in the Arbitration No.1, the Pacific entrance Cofferdam Arbitration. GUPC claimed
for overruns of almost US$200 million on the Pacific side of the project, due to significant
time delays and cost overruns, related to the design and construction of a cofferdam, which
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would allow a dry work area, and a diversion of the nearby Cocoli River. 98 GUPC based
its motion on 9 U.S.C.§10(a)(3), arguing that the arbitral tribunal majority refused to
consider relevant and necessary evidence as a result of ACP’s repeated failure to produce
pertinent documentation and witnesses.99 The arbitral tribunal held in favor of the ACP.
Also, the arbitral tribunal ordered GUPC to reimburse ACP US$22 million in legal and
administrative costs.100
The court rejected the motion to vacate the award and confirmed the arbitral
award.101 The court reasoned that the motion to vacate was time-barred because it has
passed the term of three months, after the filing or delivering of the award, to serve the
adverse party.102 The court indicated that the ACP was an instrument of a foreign state,
therefore, the Foreign Sovereignty Immunity Act (FSIA) applied. §1608 (b)(1) of the FSIA
act provides that the service must be made according to the special arrangement between
the plaintiff and the agency.103 The ACP indicated that there was no special arrangement
and that the notice by email and courier to the ACP’s counsel was not a valid service.104
GUPC argued that according to the terms of the contract the communication regarding the
arbitration proceeding had to be sent to the ACP’s counsel.105 The court held that this
motion to vacate was not part of the arbitration and that the agreement to communicate to
the ACP’s counsel was narrowed only to the procedure of the arbitration.106 GUPC also
argued that three months was not enough to be able to review the award, draft the motion
to vacate, obtain the translations of the documents, and attempt to serve ACP via letters
rogatory.107 Because of these reasons they did not have any choice other than to send the
service by special arrangement.108 The court indicated that it may be true, but GUPC did
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not attempt any proper way of serving the ACP, according to §1608(b) of the FSIA.109
Therefore, the court held that the motion to vacate was time-barred.110
Finally, the clause indicates in (vii) the arbitration agreement and the arbitration
shall be governed by the United States Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. In the
present element, the parties expressly decided which law was going to be the law applicable
to the arbitration agreement. The parties agreed to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The
lex arbitri is also the FAA, which is pro-arbitration in virtue of the Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration of the Supreme Court of the United States.111

IV.

THE DISPUTES

On January 1, 2014, when the project had advanced 71% and the construction of
the lock was at 64%,112 the problems and their impact113 became public. They started being
discussed when the Contractor sent a note to the ACP indicating that it was going to
suspend the work because the ACP did not recognize extra costs of US$1.65 billion, which
was near 50% of the original cost of the project. GUPC argued that these overruns were
caused by breach of contract caused by the ACP.114
GUPC indicated that the ACP had failed to maintain and restore the financial
equilibrium of the contract produced by the unforeseeable events that occurred in the
109
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project. The parties resolved this dispute through renegotiations and a variation order where
the ACP paid advance payments to GUPC to be able to advance with the project.115
The parties had other disputes before finishing the project, which was inaugurated
in 2016. However, even though the Panama Canal Expansion was finished, arbitral
procedures with a higher value than the projected cost are currently being litigated. In this
regard, the parties currently have an arbitration seated in Miami where the dispute is over
Unforeseeable Physical Conditions. GUPC is requesting US$4.34 billion. Due to the
confidentiality of this arbitration and its early stage, we do not have the exact prayer for
relief and arguments of each party; however this allows us to make a deeper and more
creative analysis of the consequence of unforeseeable events that fundamentally alter the
economic equilibrium of the Contract.
This article will address two issues: First, whether a tribunal, without express
conferral of powers, can adapt or modify the terms that the parties agreed to; Second, if the
arbitral tribunal considers that it has jurisdiction, can the tribunal adapt the terms of the
Contract in order to restore the altered equilibrium of the contract due to unforeseeable
circumstances that the parties did not include in the contract?
V. MAY THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT?
The arbitral tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the parties’ arbitration agreement.
Thus, the tribunal’s jurisdiction depends on what the parties agreed to. The arbitral tribunal,
based on the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, is the one who will interpret the arbitration
agreement, the contract, and will rule about its own jurisdiction.116
A. Arbitration agreement
Through the arbitration agreement, the parties decide to resolve certain contractual
or not contractual disputes by arbitration. Therefore, the tribunal should first analyze the
text of the arbitration agreement to determine if the parties agreed to grant the tribunal
jurisdiction to adapt or modify the contract.
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1. Express conferral of power.
In the case that the arbitration agreement grants the arbitral tribunal with express
conferral of power to adapt the contract, then the tribunal will have the authority to apply
the lex causae (the law applicable to the merits of the case) to modify the terms of the
agreement. Initially, because in some legal systems adaptation of a contract due to
economic imbalance is such an extraordinary measure, if the parties’ intent is that a third
party (or even a court) should modify (for example the price of the contract), they should
expressly provide for such power.117
2. In absence of express conferral of power, Supplementary contract
interpretation may be applicable
As in the arbitration agreement of the Panama Canal Contract, where there is no
express conferral of power to the arbitral tribunal to adapt or modify the contract, the debate
of interpretation starts. Clause 20 provides that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction (after
the decision of the DAB and the possibility of an amicable settlement): “If a dispute (of
any kind whatsoever) arises between the Parties in connection with, or arising out of, the
Contract or the execution of the Works. . . .” The term “any dispute” may include the
conflict in matters of interpretation of the contract and the arbitration agreement. Therefore,
if the text of the clause is ambiguous the tribunal has the authority to interpret the contract
and the intent of the parties at the moment of its conclusion.
The theory of compliance with the parties’ intent is called the supplementary
contract interpretation. Conceptually, it is not a review of the terms of the contract or the
creation of them for unforeseeable circumstances that may cause economic imbalance but
the recognition and deciphering of pre-existing contractual terms.118 The arbitral tribunal
may conclude that the issue of possible adaptation is a dispute between the parties and
should be decided. Additionally, one scholar had established that functionally the tribunals
can adapt the contract by interpretation of them because “the distinction between
interpreting and creating the law is a fiction.”119
In this regard, based on the principle that Arbiter non substituit, arbitrators do not
make contracts.120 The arbitrators should take into consideration the law applicable to the

117

BRUNO OPPETIT, THE ADAPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES: THE
HARDSHIP CLAUSE, 808 (1974).
118

Lisa Beisteiner, The Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability, The (Perceived) Power of the Arbitrator to
Revise a Contract – The Austrian Perspective, AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 80
(2014).
119

Id. at 80.

120

Id. at 77.

111

arbitration agreement, the lex arbitri, and the lex causae to determine if they can adapt the
contract.121

a. Applicable laws to the arbitration
i. The law applicable to the arbitration agreement
When the parties agree to arbitration agreements, they may subject it to a law
different from the law applicable to the substantive contract. Hence, the tribunal should
take it into consideration to supplement the arbitration agreement if the law applicable to
it allows the adaptation of the contract. If the parties agree to a law that is pro-arbitration,
by which the wording of the arbitration agreement should be interpreted, then the tribunal
may understand the parties’ intent as giving it the power to modify or adapt the contract
without exceeding the scope of the arbitration agreement. Due to the fact that the arbitration
agreement may be supplemented by the law applicable to it, if the parties agreed to a law
which interprets the arbitration agreement in a pro-arbitration way, they should expressly
reject the power of the arbitral tribunal to modify the contract due to unforeseeable
circumstances.
The applicable law to the arbitration agreement will determine the scope of the
arbitrator’s authority to interpret the arbitration agreement. Hence, in the case that the law
applicable to it requests for express conferral of power to adapt the contract and the parties
did not grant the tribunal with such a power, the tribunal should interpret this intent as a
rejection of adaptation at the moment of the conclusion of the contract.
In the case of the arbitration agreement of the Panama Canal, the applicable law is
the FAA, which according to the Supreme Court of the United States has a Federal Policy
Favoring Arbitration122 in favor of the recognition and enforcement of the arbitration
agreements. In this regard, the substantive provision of the FAA is §2 which recognizes
the enforceability of the arbitration agreements before the courts.123 Also, the FAA contains
a very broad notion of arbitrability124 which may give the tribunal broader powers than
those expressly mentioned in the arbitration agreement.125
When the parties agree to a law applicable to the arbitration agreement the tribunal
has a better notion of the intent of the parties on how to deal with different disputes about
121
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the scope of the arbitration agreement. However, parties do not always determine the law
applicable to the agreement. In this case, the tribunal must interpret the intent of the parties
to establish the most reasonable law to apply to the arbitration agreement. In this regard,
part of the doctrine indicates that there is a presumption that the applicable law to the
substantive contract should be the one applied to the arbitration agreement.126
A point to take into consideration in this discussion is that the separability doctrine
only applies to situations where the validity of the arbitration agreement is questioned or
disputed,127 it does not mean that the arbitration agreement has a different applicable law
when the parties were silenced on this topic.
The other side argues that the default law applicable to the arbitration agreement
must be the law of the seat. This position is mostly based on the presumption that the
doctrine has been interpreted in Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, which indicates
that the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may be refused if the arbitration
agreement is invalid under the agreed applicable law, or in the absence of such a choice, is
invalid under the law where the award was made (the seat of the arbitration).128
The debate of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement was the main issue in
the renowned case decided in 2012 by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales,
Sulamerica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa Engeharia SA.129 This case was based
on risk insurance policies for the construction of hydroelectric plants in Brazil. The policies
provided the law of Brazil as applicable law to the substantive contract, and the escalation
clause provided for the seat of the arbitration in London, United Kingdom. The tribunal
applied a three-prong test to determine which was the most adequate law applicable to the
arbitration agreement.
This three-prong test indicated that first the tribunal should look for the explicit
choice of law in the arbitration agreement - in the Sulamerica case there was no explicit
choice of law. Second, the tribunal should look for the implicit choice of law according to
the intent of the parties at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. Finally, if there is
no explicit or implicit choice of law, the tribunal should look for the law with the closest
and most real connection to the parties’ agreement. In this stage, the purpose and the
importance of the choice of the seat of the arbitration should be balanced against the
importance of the choice of law of the substantive contract. For this purpose, the tribunal
should also take into consideration factors like the place of performance of the contract,
where the negotiations were held, and where it was concluded.130
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Once, the tribunal has determined the law applicable to the arbitration agreement,
it can determine whether the parties, through the selection of this law, have conferred the
tribunal the power to adapt the contract. In this regard, because the arbitration agreement
is the door for the tribunal’s jurisdiction, establishing its scope and starting the arbitral
proceedings, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement has to be analyzed jointly with
the lex arbitri.

ii. Lex arbitri
The lex arbitri determines the general rules of procedure that the arbitrators must
follow during the arbitration. Principally, this law will fill the gap when the arbitration
rules selected by the parties do not deal with a specific situation. Also, the lex arbitri will
deal with the cooperation of the national courts of the country of the arbitration, and this
law will address the grounds on which a court can set aside the arbitration award.
When the arbitration rules selected by the parties do not address the matter of
possible adaptation of the contract, as in the case of the ICC Rules, the lex arbitri may fill
the gap. When the lex arbitri is different from the law applicable to the arbitration
agreement, the tribunal must consider both of them in order to determine if the contract can
be adapted. If the parties selected the law of the seat as applicable to the arbitration
agreement, then the tribunal should analyze if this law is applied with a pro-arbitration
view. In the case of the Panama Canal Contract, the parties agreed to the FAA as the law
applicable for the arbitration agreement and as the lex arbitri, when they agreed that the
seat of the arbitration would be Miami, United States.
The FAA does not address matter of adaptation of contracts by the arbitral tribunal,
however, as has been described above, the American courts usually follow the federal
policy favoring arbitration confirmed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the American legal
system grants the necessary entrustment for the arbitrators to rule about their own
jurisdiction without the court intervening (except in the case of a manifest disregard of the
law).131
Similar to other arbitration instruments (such as the UNCITRAL Model Law of
1985), the FAA also does not address the power of the arbitral tribunal to modify contracts.
According to scholars in the travaux préparatoires of the Model Law, the topic of
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adaptation and modification of the contracts was left outside for two reasons. First, it is
related to the substantive laws, and it would be inappropriate to regulate this matter in a
procedural instrument.132 Second, as a practical matter, the countries regulate the matter of
adaptation in diverse ways, therefore, the Model Law did not render any uniform solution
between the different national systems.133
The other key element, which allows the tribunal to determine if the parties granted
the power to adapt the contract or not (in case of economic imbalance), is whether the
contract contains a hardship clause.134 A hardship clause will include provisions for
hardship and remedies under the applicable law.

B. Hardship
In the lex mercatoria and in the different national systems, there is a consensus
about the definition of hardship. Hardship is generally considered the situation where the
equilibrium of the contract is fundamentally altered due to an external and unforeseeable
event that causes an unjust sacrifice or burden for one of the parties. 135 The parties can
define and regulate hardship in their contract (providing for the causes of hardship) and the
remedy. Whether the parties included this clause helps the tribunal to determine if the
parties agreed or envisioned adaptation as an eventual remedy. Therefore, in order to guide
the arbitral tribunal to determine the intent of the parties, three aspects should be analyzed.
First, if the contract provides for a hardship clause. Second, if there is no hardship clause
in the contract. Third, the approach of hardship of the applicable law.
1. If the contract provides for a hardship clause
A hardship clause is defined as a contract provision where the parties agree that in
case of a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract caused by an
unforeseeable event which makes the performance of the contract excessively onerous, but
not impossible, the disadvantaged party has the right to request renegotiations. As scholars
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established, “they organize the review of the contract when changed circumstances have
deeply altered the economy of the operation.”136
Certain contracts and applicable laws indicate that hardship gives the tribunal or
the court the jurisdiction to adapt the contract in order to restore its equilibrium. The
elements of hardship clauses are similar to force majeure clauses. The difference is that
force majeure deals with situations of absolute or objective impossibility, while hardship
deals with subjective or economic impossibility where the performance is still possible but
will exceed the limits of sacrifice for the corporation to perform. Also, hardship clauses
lead to renegotiation, while force majeure leads to exoneration of liability in case of nonperformance.137 Depending on the remedy that the parties agreed to in the text of the
hardship clause the tribunal may be able to adapt the contract.
Due to the fact that hardship clauses lead to renegotiation by the parties, some
138
authors
had concluded that if the parties do not reach an agreement after the
renegotiations a party may request the tribunal adapt the contract to be able to do what the
parties failed to - restore the equilibrium of the contract.139 Therefore, if there is a provision
in the contract referring to hardship, a tribunal may be convinced the original intent of the
parties was for a tribunal to adapt the terms of the contract if the parties could not do so
themselves.
As has been described above, the Panama Canal Contract does not contain a
hardship clause. Rather, it has a variation and adjustment clause where the cost of certain
materials, wages, and other circumstances may change during time and the parties agreed
to certain indexes and formulas to be able to deal with them. However, adjustment clauses,
where the parties take into consideration the cause of the events, are not the same as
hardship clauses, which address events that are unforeseeable. In this regard, the
adjustments clauses and the hardship clauses may be complementary when events change
the circumstances in which the formula or index was agreed upon.140
The hardship clauses have two elements. First, the hypothesis of the event. Second,
the consequence in the contractual relationship. 141
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a. The hypothesis
i. Unforeseen or unforeseeable
The parties usually describe the event that may cause hardship as unforeseen or
unforeseeable. Unforeseeable means that the parties (or a reasonable person in their
position) would be unable to foresee the event and its consequences. Unforeseen is a lower
threshold that does not address whether the parties were able to foresee the event, but only
focuses on if the parties in fact foresaw the event.142 As an example, the ICC Hardship
Clause 2003 provides as hypothesis, “a) the continued performance of its contractual duties
has become excessively onerous due to an event beyond its reasonable control which it
could not reasonably have been expected to have taken into account at the time of the
conclusion of the contract; and that b) it could not reasonably have avoided or overcome
the event or its consequences.”

ii. Alteration of the equilibrium of the contract
In the description of the hypothesis the parties also address the consequence of the
unforeseeable or unforeseen event in the contract with consequences such as: the event
eliminated the fairness or equity of the deal, or the event altered the equilibrium of the
contract. First, the tribunal should look for the wording of the hardship clause to determine
if it provides for an economic threshold that the parties agreed to.
If the parties did not agree to a specific threshold, then the tribunal may look to the
negotiations of the parties to determine which thresholds the parties discussed in their
negotiations. In absence of the agreement of the parties, the threshold must be addressed
in a case-by-case basis, considering a totality of the circumstances. For example, if the
parties did not agree to an economic threshold, but agreed that the hardship clause would
be triggered if the event made the contract more onerous, then the tribunal should look for
a lower threshold than excessively onerous. However, the common standard in the industry
is that the simple loss of the profit for the disadvantaged party cannot amount to hardship.143
In absence of the agreement by the parties, scholars have different positions
concerning what is a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract. If the impact
of an event is analyzed with an objective standard, some authors proposed a 100% increase
in the cost144 for contracts where the parties had not allocated the risks. When, the tribunal
is determining the threshold in international contracts, due regard has to be given to the
142

See Draetta, supra note 138, at 195.

“A party is also not entitled to use the hardship exemption only because the contract turned out to be less
profitable than expected at the time of conclusion of the contract.” Daniel Girsberger, Fundamental
Alteration of the Contractual Equilibrium under Hardship Exemption, 19 Jurisprudence Review 121, 123
(2012). See Christoph Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption
for Nonperformance in International Arbitration, 437 (2008).
143

144

See Brunner, supra note 143, at 430.

117

fact that the threshold of 50% was removed from the UNIDROIT Principles for being
considered too low by the international scholars according to its travaux préparatoires.145
Another criteria that the tribunal may take into account is the possibility of the
financial ruin of the obligor. However, the tribunal must analyze the totality of
circumstances for the parties, their negotiations, and the representations in the contract,
because tribunals cannot start becoming the salvation for companies with solvency
problems.146
These economic thresholds are considered applicable to short term contracts, such
as the majority of sale of goods. Professor Brunner argued that, in theory, the same
standards apply to long term contracts.147
In this regard, when the contractor delivers the work for a fixed or lump sum price,
it assumes the risk of cost increases, but not of excessive cost increases.148 Once again,
there is no definition of the difference between an excessive and a normal cost increase. Is
it an objective standard or a subjective standard? It should be a reasonable subjective
standard with due regard to the circumstances of each case and without any unreasonable
detachment of the objective standard.
However, if the parties did allocate specific risks and the economic disequilibrium
is because of one of these risks, there is no place for the hardship exemption.149 For
example, in the Panama Canal Contract sub-clause 17.6 of risk allocation it expressly
provides that “neither party shall be liable to the other party for loss of use of any works,
loss of profit, loss of any contract or for any indirect or consequential loss or damage which
may be suffered by the other party in connection with the contract.” Therefore, according
to the Contract each party is responsible for its own financial situation and in the case of
an unforeseeable event that make the contract more onerous a tribunal may not adapt the
contract because of the risk allocation.
The terms in the Contract provide for any loss of profit or for any consequential
damage deriving from the Contract. However, may the tribunal think differently if it was
an unforeseeable event that caused a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the
contract rendering the performance excessively onerous?150 The tribunal must interpret the
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risk allocation of the parties. In absence of a hardship clause, may the tribunal find hardship
under the applicable law to the contract? What would be the remedy in that case? These
are questions that we will address below in the section regarding when the parties do not
have a hardship clause.
b. The remedy in the hardship clause
If the parties agreed to a hardship clause and the elements of the hypothesis were
triggered, what happens now? In the example of the ICC Hardship Clause 2003, it provides
for renegotiation or termination as a consequence for hardship.151
It has to be noted, that the parties may provide for any remedy in their hardship
clause. Usually the parties agree to first attempt to renegotiation. In case of failed
renegotiation, the question of adaptation or termination of the contract will arise.
i. Renegotiations
If one party believes an event will produce hardship if it performs or continue
performance of the contract, it may request for renegotiations to address the issue with the
other party and protect the economic equilibrium of the contract. It is important to
remember that hardship exemption only deals with new situations which have not been
performed. If the party has performed already, hardship is not applicable as an exemption.
If the renegotiations failed, the obligor remains responsible to perform its obligation. If the
obligor requests the tribunal to adapt the contract and the tribunal does not grant adaptation,
the obligor still remains responsible to perform, which is different from the force majeure
(where the obligor is exempted from performance because the obligation is impossible to
perform, temporarily or permanently).
Which criteria or standard applies to the renegotiations of the parties? The standard
for renegotiations is good faith.152 Therefore, due attention must be paid to the points of
each party in order to render a common determination. The renegotiation is a duty of
moyens and not of result.153 In other words, the parties have an obligation to listen and
analyze the arguments and reasons of the other party but do not have an obligation to accept
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the offer of new terms. If a party disagrees that the disadvantaged party is in a hardship
situation it must inform the disadvantaged party in a reasoned and clear way.154
The fastest and most efficient way to adapt the contract is between the parties
because they know better than anyone the circumstances of their business. However, if the
parties cannot make an agreement but have provided for adaptation, then the next step is
to request a tribunal to adapt the contract.155

ii. Adaptation
If the parties provided for adaptation in the hardship clause, the decision will be
taken by the third party to determine, according to the rest of the clauses, the adaptation of
the contract to restore the equilibrium of the contract.156 In this regard, some clauses
provide for the condition of the failing of the agreement of the parties in the
renegotiations.157
When the hardship clause provides for adaptation it is related to the arbitration
agreement. Therefore, even if the arbitration agreement does not address the power of the
arbitral tribunal to adapt the contract, if the hardship clause provides for adaptation as a
remedy for the hardship, most likely the parties had the intent at the moment of the
conclusion of the contract that the tribunal should adapt the contract.158

iii. Termination
Another consequence of the hardship clause may be the termination of the contract.
Depending on the structure of the hardship clause, if the parties do not enter successful
renegotiations the tribunal may terminate the contract, adapt it, or maintain the original text
of the contract.
In long-term construction contracts, there are performance bonds if the contract is
terminated that the employer would cash and use as payment for another contractor to
154
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finish the project. However, it is in the best interest of both parties to renegotiate first
because a termination in that regard would not benefit anyone. In other words it was a loselose situation.
The parties in international contracts usually agree regarding the consequences of
the termination of the contract because they desire predictability and to limit the discretion
of the tribunal. Thus, if the parties agreed to a hardship clause with adaptation as a remedy,
in the arbitral tribunal’s analysis of the clause the tribunal most likely will conclude that
the parties’ intent at the moment of the conclusion of the contract was to grant jurisdiction
and power to the tribunal to modify the terms of the contract. However, even if the tribunal
acknowledges its power to adapt the contract, the arbitral tribunals are reluctant to modify
the terms of the agreement due to the uncertainty that it may cause in the international
business community, which agree to international contracts to get as much predictability
and certainty as possible. Therefore, there is an interaction inside the contract between the
hardship clause and the arbitration agreement derived from the intent of the parties, which
grants the arbitrators the power to adapt the contract.
At this point, it is important to ask, what happens when the contract does not
provide for a hardship clause? What weight should the tribunal give regarding the lex
causae and its interaction with the arbitration agreement? What is the interaction between
the lex causae and the text of the contract, in absence of a hardship clause?
2. If the contract does not provide for a hardship clause
The next debate centers upon when the parties did not agree to a hardship clause in
their contract, but they agreed to an applicable law that contains a provision for hardship.
In this regard, if the arbitration agreement does not prohibit the adaptation of the contract
and the lex causae provides for the remedy of adaptation in cases of hardship, the arbitral
tribunal will derive its power to grant adaptation from the law applicable to the merits of
the dispute. Therefore, when the parties agree to the law applicable to the contract, it is a
manifestation of the parties’ intent to provide the provisions of the lex causae to be part of
the contract, as long as it does not contradict the derogations of the non-mandatory rules
of the lex causae agreed by the parties in the contract.
Thus, if the tribunal determines that it has jurisdiction and power. At that moment,
the tribunal will analyze the merits of the dispute. The facts should be applied to the rules
of the applicable law, and application must be rendered to consider if there is hardship and
the consequence.

3. Hardship and its consequences in different national laws
As has been stated above, when the Model Law did not address the adaptation of
the contract because of the different perspectives of the national legal systems. Different
national laws contain different provisions similar to hardship, which cause different
outcomes. Panamanian Civil Code establishes the Termination of the contract for
excessively onerous (terminación del contrato por excesiva onerosidad). In American law
it is called impracticability. In Italy it is called Onerosità o difficoltà dell'esecuzione and
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eccessiva onerosità sopravvenuta. In France and Belgium it is called imprévision.
Therefore, the causes and consequences of hardship will depend on the applicable law to
the contract that the parties agreed to.

a. Panama159
In the Panama Canal Contract the applicable law is Panamanian law, therefore, the
contract relationship is governed by the Civil Code of Panama. This civil code provides in
its art. 1161-A to 1161-C, the termination of the contract for excessively onerous.
Art. 1161-A addresses the bilateral contracts of continued performance, where in
the arise of an extraordinary and unforeseeable event the obligation of one of the parties
become excessively onerous, the disadvantaged party has a right to request the termination
of the contract. However, if the event is part of the normal developments of that type of
contract there is no right of termination by the disadvantaged party. The party against a
request for termination that has been addressed may propose to amend the terms of the
contract to restore the equilibrium of the contract.
This article requires that the event was extraordinary and unforeseeable for the
parties, making the contract excessively onerous, and that the event was not part of the
normal development of the contract (i.e. construction contract). Therefore, this last element
applies the usages of the industry applicable to the contract and provides for a presumption
for the level of experience and professionalism of the parties according to the type of
contract. Thus, the parties are responsible for addressing the allocation of risks to be able
to shield themselves in cases of unforeseeable circumstances because the law is not going
to give the disadvantaged party a remedy to restore the equilibrium of the contract if the
parties did not agree.
As can be deduced from this article, the Civil Code of Panama is conservative
regarding unforeseeable circumstances that make the contract excessively onerous, only
granting the disadvantaged party the right to terminate the contract, not giving to this party
a right to request for renegotiations to resolve the disequilibrium of the contract. Thus, the
principle of pacta sunt servanda in Panamanian law has a primary position and does not
provide for adaptation in cases of hardship. According to the Civil Code, the renegotiations
are at the discretion of the requested party in response to the termination proposed by the
disadvantaged party. In practice, termination is the most extreme remedy because it ends
the performance of the contract. However, usually the parties try to renegotiate to be able
to solve the dispute.
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Therefore, because in the Panama Canal Contract the parties did not agree to a
hardship clause and the applicable law is Panamanian law, there is no place for a request
to the tribunal to adapt the Contract.160
In the Panama Canal Contract the causes of termination by the Employer and by
the Contractor and the consequences of termination are regulated in the art. 15. The
Employer reserved a right to terminate the Contract at their convenience161 with the duty
to notify the Contractor 28 days beforehand. After that time the termination is effective. In
this regard, the consequences of the termination by the Employer include paying the
Contractor for all the work done and proved to the employer representative according to
the value at termination.
In the case that the Contractor required the termination of the Contract due to the
causes enumerated in sub-clause 16.2,162 it can be interpreted that if the Contractor made a
request to the tribunal for the termination of the Contract, then the tribunal should apply
the consequences of the terminations according to sub-clauses 16.4 and 19.6, which require
the payment at termination. These consequences indicate that the employer’s representative
shall determine the value of the work done and issue a Payment Certificate, which shall
include the amount payable for any work for which a price is stated in the Contract, the
materials that the Contractor acquired or was going to acquire in which the Contractor is
liable for its delivery, for any cost caused in expectation to terminate the work, the removal
of the equipment of the Contractor, and the cost of reparation of the Contractor at the date
of termination. Thus, if the Contractor had requested termination of the Contract by the
arbitral tribunal the consequences should be those agreed to by the parties in concept of
termination.
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In the case Gaming & Services Panama, S.A. v. Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas (MEF), decided by
the Supreme Court of Panama in 2006. The court established that because the parties did not agree a clause
to maintain the contractual equilibrium, there was no obligation of the parties to maintain the economical
equilibrium of the contract.
“The termination for convenience clauses have the purpose to enable an owner . . . unilaterally to terminate
a contractual relationship at any time it deems its interests not to be served by the contract.” See DRAETTA ET
AL., supra note at 138, at 211.
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Sub-clause 16.2. of the Conditions of the Contract establishes: The Contractor shall be entitled to terminate
the Contract if: (a) the Employer's Representative fails, within 104 days after receiving a Statement and
supporting documents, to issue the relevant Payment Certificate; (b) the Contractor does not receive the
amount due under an Interim Payment Certificate, for undisputed items, within 90 days after the expiry of
the time stated in sub-Clause 14.7 [Payment] within which payment is to be made (except for deductions in
accordance with sub-Clause 2.5 [Employer's Claims]); (c) the Employer substantially fails to perform his
obligations under the Contract;(d) the Employer fails to comply with sub-Clause 1.6 [Contract Agreement];
(e) a prolonged suspension affects the whole of the Works as described in sub-Clause 8.11 [Prolonged
Suspension]; or (f) the Employer becomes bankrupt or insolvent, goes into liquidation, has a receiving or
administration order made against him, compounds with his creditors, or carries on business under a receiver,
trustee or manager for the benefit of his creditors, or if any act is done or event occurs which (under applicable
Laws) has a similar effect to any of these acts or events. In any of these events or circumstances, the
Contractor may, upon giving 14 days' notice to the Employer, terminate the Contract. However, in the case
of sub-paragraph (e) or (f) of this sub-Clause 16.2, the Contractor may by notice terminate the Contract
immediately. The Contractor's election to terminate the Contract shall not prejudice any other rights of the
Contractor, under the Contract or otherwise.
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b. United States
The contracts based on civil law are usually not as detailed as contracts based on
common law.163 This is because the civil codes are seen as supplementing the contract
between the parties, therefore, by selecting an applicable law, it becomes part of the
contract. On the other hand, contracts based in common law do not have the same level of
supplementation as statutes or jurisprudence.164 For this reason, the principle of pacta sunt
servanda165 has been the main rule in the American legal system because “certainty and
finality are important objectives of contract law given the role that contracts play in the
global commercial environment.”166
i. Changes of circumstances in Construction Contracts
This plain interpretation of the wording of the contracts was applied in the Olympus
Corp. v. U.S. On March 10, 1987, Olympus Corp. entered into a fixed-price construction
contract with the United States to pave the plant yards at the Stratford Army Engine Plant
in Connecticut.167 The contract included a standard Differing Site Conditions clause.168 On
April 18, the works started. One month later, Textron Lycoming, an independent
government contractor that operated the plant, accidentally cut open an underground oil
163
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This principle has been also applied in the public contracts where the state will be protected in case the
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already contracted or performed obligation. City of Greenville v. Emerson, 740 S.W. 2d 10 (Tex. App. 1987)
in RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY SAMUEL WILLISTON VOLUME 3 at 683,
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City to pay additional sums of money for services already rendered and benefits already paid. In effect, it
would constitute in Greenville entering into a second contract with appellees to pay them additional benefits
above what they received under a prior valid existing contract for no additional consideration.”
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Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of Commercial Impracticability, 13 U.N.H. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2015).
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Which is similar to Sub-Clause 4.12 of the FIDIC Yellow Book and the Panama Canal Contract. See
VÖLKMAR JAEGER, supra note 163, at 186-189. In the Olympus case, the text of the clause was: “(a) The
Contractor [Olympus] shall promptly, and before the conditions are disturbed, give a written notice to the
Contracting Officer of (1) subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which differ materially from
those indicated in this contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature, which
differ materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inherent in the work of the
character provided for in the contract. (b) The Contracting Officer shall investigate the site conditions
promptly after receiving the notice. If the conditions do materially so differ and cause an increase or decrease
in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required for, performing any part of the work under this contract,
whether or not changed as a result of the conditions, an equitable adjustment shall be made under this clause
and the contract modified in writing accordingly.”
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pipe, which prevented Olympus from paving the plant yard.169 After this, the employees of
Textron went to a strike, which prevented Olympus from accessing the place for nearly
two months.170 When the strike ended Olympus helped the contractor clean the polluted
soil, then resumed paving the yard on August 2.171
Olympus timely notified the contracting officer of both the contamination and strike
delays and requested an equitable adjustment to the contract of a 69-day time extension
and a price modification for additional costs of US$107,988.79.172 The officer granted the
time extension but only granted the increase of the price of US$5,358.00 (only adjusting
for the contamination delay).173 Olympus rejected this proposal and submitted a claim to
the officer requesting both additional costs and a final decision. The officer rejected these
requests in the final decision.174
Thereafter, Olympus filed a claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims,
which dismissed the claims and granted the government summary judgment.175 The court
held that the Differing Site Conditions Clause only applied for the conditions existing at
the time of the conclusion of the contract.176 Therefore, was not applicable to events that
occurred after the conclusion of the agreement such as the soil contamination and the strike
of the Textron employees.177 The court also indicated the Olympus assumed the risk of
unexpected costs such as those associated with labor unrest.178 Olympus appealed.179
The appeal only focused on a de novo interpretation of the public contract as a
matter of law.180 Olympus argued that the Differing Site Conditions did not expressly
limited its scope to only situations at the moment of the conclusion of the contract.181
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Olympus indicated that this approach will validate the subjective intent182 of the
government and that this clause shifted the risk of all unanticipated adverse site conditions
to the government.183
The court indicated that the Differing Site Conditions clause has been used in public
contracts for over half a century with the purpose of shifting the risk of adverse subsurface
or latent physical conditions from the contractor, who normally bears such risk under a
fixed-price contract, to the government. The court, citing United States v. Spearin,
indicated that: “Where one agrees to do, for a fixed sum, a thing possible to be performed,
he will not be excused or become entitled to additional compensation, because unforeseen
difficulties are encountered.”184
Also, the court pointed out that the purpose of this clause is to prevent the bidders
from increasing the price of the bids because of the previous inspections of the physical
conditions; therefore the government takes the risk of the unforeseeable event at the
moment of the conclusion of the contract. Moreover, the court stated that: “Although we
interpret public contracts according to their “ordinary and commonly accepted
meaning,”185 we also do so from the vantage point of a “‘reasonable and prudent’
contractor.”186 Such a contractor would have been familiar with the long-standing
limitation on a Differing Site Conditions clause to conditions existing when the contract
was executed. Moreover, we are bound by precedent. Therefore, consistent with our
precedent, we hold that the Court of Federal Claims did not err in interpreting the Differing
Site Conditions clause to apply only to conditions existing at the time of contracting.”
Finally, the court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.187
This case shows the approach used for the interpretation of contracts in American
law, where the courts do not exercise a paternalistic interpretation of the plain wording of
the contract. The court did not find any ambiguity in the clause and applied it only to the
unanticipated circumstances that existed at the moment of the conclusion of the contract,
which reaffirms that the purpose of contracts is to provide certainty and predictability.188
To the Olympus argument of the subjective intent, the court indicated that a reasonable and
prudent contractor should have known the meaning and the scope of the Differing Site
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Clause, and therefore applied the reasonable person test according to the circumstances of
the plaintiff.189
Also, this case pointed out the fact that when a party, i.e. contractor, signed a lumpsum price contract, as in the Panama Canal Contract, the differing site clause or
unforeseeable physical conditions clause shift the risk from the contractor to the
employer.190 Therefore, if the contract provides for the circumstances that may trigger this
clause, it means that any other unforeseeable circumstances will be the contractor’s risk.191
Years later, in 2013, in Extreme Coatings, Inc. v. U.S., where the contractor who
was awarded a contract to perform partial recoating of downstream side of spillway radial
gates at the dam sued United States pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act after its certified
claim for equitable adjustment was denied by the contracting officer.192 United States filed
a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12 (b)(6).193 The court denied this motion to dismiss.194
Then, the court based on the case Randa/Madison Joint Venture III v. Dahlberg pointed
out the elements for the type I and type II of Differing Site Conditions clauses.195
The type I of differing site conditions is defined as: “subsurface or latent physical
conditions at the site which differ materially from those indicated in this contract.”196 The
court indicated the four elements that must be met for this clause to apply:
First, the contractor must prove that a reasonable contractor reading
the contract documents as a whole would interpret them as making
a representation as to the site conditions. Second, the contractor
must prove that the actual site conditions were not reasonably
foreseeable to the contractor, with the information available to the
particular contractor outside the contract documents, i.e., that the
contractor “reasonably relied” on the representations. Third, the
contractor must prove that the particular contractor in fact relied on
the contract representation. Fourth, the contractor must prove that
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the conditions differed materially from those represented and that
the contractor suffered damages as a result.197
The type II of differing site conditions is defined as: “unknown physical conditions
at the site, of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily encountered
and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the
contract.”198
According to the court, for this clause to be applicable the following elements must
be met: “First, plaintiff must show that it did not know about the physical condition.
Second, plaintiff must show that it could not have anticipated the condition from inspection
or general inspection or general experience. Third, plaintiff must show that the condition
varied from the norm in similar contracting work.”199
Analyzing the four elements required by Type I and the three elements by Type II,
the court indicated that the temporal limitation (analyzed in the Olympus case) was not
found explicitly in the test, and that it should be added to the tests according to the
circumstances of the case.200 In this regard, the court indicated that this temporal limitation
may have variations or exceptions which preclude its application or requirement as a
heightened pleading standard.201 As an example, the court indicated that in some cases the
moment of the origin of the event has been analyzed at the time of the issuance of the notice
to proceed.202
Thus, the court indicated that the difference between the elements required by the
Type I and Type II of differing site conditions, the temporal limitation “is not a bedrock
hurdle at the notice pleading level.”203
Another important aspect of this case, is that in neither the type I or type II one of
their elements is the financial situation of one party or that the measure will be taken to
restore equilibrium of the contract. Therefore, the elements of these clauses only refer to
the characteristic of the event and not the situation of a particular party as in hardship
occurrences, where the equilibrium of the contract is altered.
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On December 7, 2018, in W.M. Schultz Constr., Inc. v. Vermont Agency of
Transportation, the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed a judgment where the plaintiff
requested an equitable adjustment due to differing-site conditions.204
The contract to replace four bridges destroyed by Tropical Storm Irene205 was
agreed to in 2013. The first three bridges were built without problems.206 This dispute was
concerning the fourth bridge.207 According to the plaintiff, the assumed rock elevation of
802.5 feet from the bottom of the bridge footing as shown on VTrans’ plans was in fact
drastically irregular and much lower in some areas than shown.208
Schultz argued that the uneven elevation forced them to change the specific means
and methods from a sandbag style cofferdam to a steel-sheet pile cofferdam. This change
would substantially increase costs beyond the original estimate.209
The contractor submitted the claim to the chief engineer, who denied the claim.210
The contractor appealed to the Transportation Board, which is a specialized body in
construction contracts. The Transportation Board found that the contractor’s reliance on
the conditions present in the contract was reasonable and ruled in its favor, indicating that
due to the additional costs the contractor was entitled to US$589,782.09 as damages.211
VTrans appealed this decision.212
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VTrans argued that the Board did not take into consideration the decision of the
agency regarding the claim.213 The court indicated that the Board, took into consideration
the decision of the agency, but the Board does not owe deference to the agency’s decisions.
It was not obligated to discuss, explain, or refute the Chief Engineer’s analysis of the
claim.214
This analysis by the court confirms that the decisions of the agent appointed by the
employer or owner of the project are not considered a starting point for the discussion as a
judgment in a trial court where the tribunal has to reversed or affirmed.215 The decision of
the engineer will only serve as evidence for the tribunal.216
Then, the court indicated that because the contract interpretation is a matter of law,
it was a de novo review, with due consideration to the decision rendered by the Board as
an experienced institution.217 The court applied the Stuyvesant test, where the contractor
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(1) the conditions indicated in the contract differ materially from
those it encounters during performance;
(2) [t]he conditions actually encountered [were] reasonably
unforeseeable based on all the information available to the
contractor at the time of bidding;
(3) it reasonably relied upon its interpretation of the contract and
contract-related documents; and
(4) it was damaged as a result of the material variation between the
expected and encountered conditions.218
In relation to the first element, the court indicated that is “based on how a reasonable
contractor would interpret the contract documents as a whole.”219 A “contractor does not
need to show that its ‘interpretation of the contract is the only reasonable one, but it does
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bear the burden of showing that its construction is at least a reasonable reading.’”220 In this
regard, the court indicated that:
Viewing the contract materials here as a whole—including multiple
plan sheets depicting ledge at 802.5 feet and the 1974 bridge
information—a reasonable contractor would not view the use of the
word “approximate” to convey that the ledge elevation could vary
wildly from what was represented. We are similarly unpersuaded
that the various design contingencies in the instant case conveyed
that the ledge was not as it was represented to be in multiple plan
sheets. These caveats—including a statement that elevation could
vary and the inclusion of a method of payment for excavation up to
fifteen feet below the design—must be considered through the lens
of “known information” provided to prospective bidders and in light
of the contract materials as a whole.221
The court noted that VTrans did not provide for any witness or expert declaring that
the interpretation of the contractor was unreasonable. Therefore, the court made an
interpretation of the contract as a whole and not individual terms (such as approximate,
argued by VTrans as a ground for exemption of certainty of the information provided to
the contractor).
Regarding the second and third element, because the Board was the fact-finder, the
findings were not going to be disturbed unless they were clearly erroneous. The Board
relied in the testimony of Mr. Waite, who designed the cofferdam for Schultz, which even
though was a witness, the board relied on his statement as an experienced engineer. The
court indicated that regardless of being considered a witness or an expert, “it was fair to
rely on his testimony with respect to these elements here.”
With respect to the fourth element, which addresses the damages. The court
indicated that Schultz suffered damage from the variation between the expected and the
encountered conditions. Thus, the court indicated that the Board found that:
Schultz reasonably relied on the ledge elevations in the bid
documents in designing and pricing its cofferdam. Because the ledge
was much deeper than anticipated, Schultz was required to construct
a different, more time-consuming, and more expensive cofferdam.
In the words of subdivision (b), the differing site conditions “caused
an increase . . . in the cost or time required for the performance of
any work under the Contract”.222
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This case applies a similar test to one applied in Extreme Coatings, for the different
conditions clause to be applicable it requires four elements: (1) that the conditions
encountered during performance materially deviate from the conditions indicated in the
contract, (2) that these conditions were reasonably unforeseeable for the contractor taking
into consideration the information available at the moment of the bidding, (3) the contractor
reasonably relied in the description of the conditions provided in the contract, (4) the
contractor suffered damages from the unforeseeable change. Also, this case pointed out
that even if the contractor suffered damages, it is obliged to continue the performance of
the project. Therefore, the courts are not going to deviate from what the parties agreed to
even in the occurrence of unforeseeable changes. If these unforeseeable changes occur,
then the contractor will be responsible.

ii. Changes of circumstances due to Impracticability
Taking this pacta sunt servanda as the Star of Bethlehem, the American legal
system also provides for the situation in which the obligation became excessively onerous
due to unforeseeable circumstances with the denomination of impracticability. The § 261
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines impracticability as:
§ 261. Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.
The current theory of impracticability does not focus on the implied terms of the
parties but on whether justice requires departure from the general rule that the obligor bears
the risk of increased difficulty or performance in light of extraordinary circumstances.223
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth indicated that for impracticability to apply, four elements
must be met: “(1) the event must rendered the performance as agreed, impracticable; (2)
the nonoccurrence of the event must have been a basic assumption on which the contract
was made; (3) the event was not the fault of the disadvantaged party; and (4) the party must
not have assumed a greater obligation than the law imposes.”224
The first element addresses the economic imbalance of the performance, where a
party is not obliged to exceed the limit of sacrifice, when the performance will be extremely
burdensome. The second element addresses that the event was unforeseeable for the parties
and did not take it into account at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. The third
223
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element indicates that no party may benefit from a circumstance that itself caused. Finally,
that the party did not assume the risk in the contract, implicitly or explicitly.
According to the §261 Restatement (Second) of Contracts the main remedy is
discharge of the obligation for the disadvantaged party, which is related to the termination
of the contract. On this note, it is important to mention that especially in long-term
contracts, in the event of hardship, the parties have an obligation of good faith to try to
renegotiate the terms of the contract.225 However, the supplement of the principle of good
faith in the common law is not the rule but an exception.226 This is based on the notion that
the courts or tribunals do not rewrite contracts and will not intervene in the essential terms
agreed to by the parties.
However, in chapter 11, which deals with impracticability, section §272 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that if any remedy will not avoid injustice, the
court may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the parties'
reliance interests. Therefore, in the interpretation of this provision, it grants the courts and
tribunals the power to adapt the terms of the contracts,227 but as an extraordinary measure
when no other remedy will prevent injustice. This section will be specially applied in the
case of long-term contracts where the parties cannot get modification of the agreement, but
will be the best solution taking into consideration the circumstances of each case.
There is an exception, which has been criticized,228 when a court uses an index
clause to modify the terms of the contract due to the excess burden that the clause was
going to cause one of the parties. In Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc.,229 a decision
held in the Federal Court of Pennsylvania in 1980. The parties entered into a supply
contract in 1967 until 1983, with an option to extent, where ALCOA was going to convert
alumina supplied by Essex into molten aluminium, and then Essex would take ownership
of this material for further processing.230 This contract contained an indexing formula, in
which the non-labour costs were going to be escalated in accordance with the Wholesale
225
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Price Index for Industrial Commodities.231 Changes in the price of oil caused an increased
cost of the electricity which was used for the molten aluminium, which was going to
represent a loss for the seller of US$60 million during the life of the contract.232 ALCOA
requested for the contract to be excused because the agreed index was not according to the
unforeseeable new circumstances.233 The tribunal decided to adapt the index in order to
reflect the new economic conditions.
c. Italy234
In the Italian law the concept for hardship is present in the art. 1664 of the Civil
Code with the title Onerosità o difficoltà dell'esecuzione and in the art. 1467 with the title
eccessiva onerosità sopravvenuta.
i. Onerosità o difficoltà dell'esecuzione
The art. 1664 of the Italian Civil Code applies specially to construction contracts.
The first paragraph of this article provides that if unforeseeable circumstances cause an
increase or decrease to the cost of materials or labor that accounts for more than 10% of
the total agreed price, the contractor or client can request a revision of the price. The
revision can be granted only for that difference which exceeds the tenth.
In order for this first paragraph to be applicable, the following requirements must
be met. First, the event needs to be unforeseeable235 (but not necessarily extraordinary),
which only requires that the parties were not able to foresee the event, but the event does
not need to be unimaginable. The unforeseeable threshold takes into consideration the
presumption of sophistication and expertise of the parties, indicating that if the parties were
able to foresee the event, this provision is not applicable.236 Second, because the economic
prices in construction projects are high, the suggested threshold of 100% will not be
applicable. To solve this problem Italian law requires an increase or a decrease of more
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than 10% in the cost237 of the project to be able to request a revision or renegotiations of
the contract price. It also indicates that the revision can be granted, which is interpreted to
mean that the modification of the contract price may be resolved by a court or tribunal, but
this modification is limited to the increase or decrease over the 10%. For example, if the
contractor faces overruns that increase the price of the costs by 25%, the court may adapt
the contract and increase the price by 15% (the amount over 10%). Therefore, if the parties
intend to protect themselves from increases of less than 10% they should include a hardship
clause to deal with this situation.238
The second paragraph of this article provides that if in the course of the work
difficulties of execution arise due to geological, water and similar causes, not foreseen by
the parties, which gives the contractor the right to fair compensation if performance is
considerably more expensive. This provision applies due to physical conditions that were
different from those considered and known by the parties at the moment of the conclusion
of the contract. These conditions may also be affected by acts of man. This provision has
a lower threshold, only requiring that the parties did not actually foresee it, even though
they were capable of foreseeing it. Equally important, it also focuses on the increase in the
cost of the performance, by indicating that it has to be considerably more expensive, where
the threshold of more than 10% is taken into consideration by the tribunal. This produces
a right for the contractor to request fair compensation for the overruns they had to pay to
keep the works of the project. Thus, the request for adaptation of the price is first made to
the employer. If the parties do not agree, then the contractor has a default right to require
that the tribunal adapt the price of the contract to reflect the increase in the costs.
The provisions of this article are not mandatory for the parties, and they may depart
from it.239 This consequence may be the invariability of the fee, related to an increase of
costs for unforeseeable circumstances.240 The derogation from this provision does not need
to be express in the contract, it can be implied. The court or tribunal may use the legal tools
for the interpretation of contracts and the circumstances of negotiations between the parties
to establish this intent.241
ii. Eccessiva Onerosità Sopravvenuta
Article 1467, which addresses the eccessiva onerosità sopravvenuta, is extremely
similar to art. 1161-A of the Civil Code of Panama. According to the Italian law, “courts
and arbitrators do not have the power to adapt contracts in cases of hardship being such
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possibility only granted to the advantaged party.”242 The Corte di Cassazione in 2000 in
the case of Pamedil v. Bruno, Giur It, the court ruled:
[T]he only party entitled to solicit the equitable modification of the
contract’s conditions is the one sued by means of the termination
claim for excessive onerousness, since it has to be excluded that a
request of reduction ad aequitatem can be opposed to a request of
performance of the contract [i.e., the equitable modification of the
contract cannot be asked by the party affected by hardship when it
is sued in order to justify its breach of contract].243
According to Professor Christoph Brunner, the ICC Hardship Clause 2003, which
does not provide for adaptation, was based on the Italian Rule. In this regard, in the Italian
Rule there is no adaptation of the contract and the disadvantaged party may only request
termination if the other party does not provide an alternative.244
The Corte di Cassazione has indicated that when the requested party makes only
one offer, instead of approving the termination of the contract requested by the
disadvantaged party,245 the Court can only analyze if that proposal is equitable. However,
when the parties have proposed alternative proposals for the consideration of the court, it
can decide and adapt the contract.246
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d. France and Belgium247
i. France
In the French legal system, the principle of pacta sunt servanda248 is king, but
hardship now seems as the New Kid on the Block because of the reforms to the French
Civil Code. Now hardship is contemplated in art. 1195 of the French Civil Code. Until
2016, the only concept similar to hardship in the French law was the imprévision,249 which
only dealt with extreme change in economic circumstances due to unforeseeable
circumstances in administrative contracts (i.e. contracts with the French government). In
case of changes in the economic circumstances the contract could be adapted in order to
maintain the long-term relationship, the service, and the works for the community.250 While
in private law, in the past, if the parties did not expressly provide for adaptation of the
contract due to hardship, adaptation could not be requested and the tribunal did not have
the power to adapt it.
Before the change of legislation, French jurisprudence reacted to the change in
economic circumstances in the private contracts, indicating that in case of economic
disequilibrium for unforeseeable circumstances the parties have a duty of good faith, and
included in this principle there is a duty to renegotiate in good faith to address the new
circumstances.
In the case Electricité de France v. Societé Shell Française, decided in 1976 by the
Cour d´appel de Paris, the parties agreed to an indexation clause and a hardship clause that
provided:
If the price of fuel sustains vis-a-vis its initial value a rise or fall of
more than 6 francs-a-ton; the parties should come together to
examine the modifications to be brought to the contract; should they
fail to agree, E.D.F. shall have the right to rescind the contract in the
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case of an increase in price and Shell shall have the same right in the
case of a decrease in price.
Due to the economic situation, the price fell below the agreed floor between the
parties, they renegotiated in good faith without any outcome. The Tribunal de commerce
indicated that it could not intervene in the autonomy of the parties and it could not modify,
and therefore, invented a new indexation clause. In this regard, the Cour d´appeal de Paris
proposed the parties renegotiate again for 6 months with an observer to get an agreement.
If the parties could not reach an agreement in that time, then the tribunal would try to revise
the contract, but the tribunal could not act by changing any of the foundations of the
contract.
This principle of imprévision from French jurisprudence, which applies to public
contracts, has been interpreted to state that the courts can only act by the autonomy of the
parties, but the courts could not modify or adapt private contracts.251 This course of thought
was maintained in the following French jurisprudence.
In Sociéte d’Exploitation de Chauffage (SEC) vs Soffimat, judgment rendered on
June 29, 2010 by the Cour de Cassation, the issue was a long-term contract where Soffimat
had to maintenance two motors of a central production of SEC, and in 2008 the price of
the raw materials and metal increased more than triple from 1998 due to unforeseeable
circumstances. Soffimat proposed renegotiations, but SEC rejected then and sued in court
for performance according to the original terms of the deal. The trial court and the appeal
court rendered their decisions in favor of the plaintiff. The Cour de Cassation reversed the
judgments of the lower courts and held that because the economic equilibrium of the
contract was fundamentally altered, while the parties agreed to different conditions at the
moment of the conclusion of the contract, SEC had a duty of good faith to renegotiate with
Soffimat.252
In the ICC case No. 9994 rendered in 2001,253 where the applicable law was French
law, a French company (claimant) had a long-term contract to supply raw materials to an
American company (respondent) that was allowed to make, use, and sell products from
these materials. The parties discussed the possibility of adding a provision to the force
majeure clause regarding a possible economic disequilibrium of the contract based on an
increase in the processing of the placentae due to any cause not within its control. This
proposal was rejected by the respondent. The government agency imposed new regulations
over the placentae where the raw materials are derived, which increased excessively the
cost for the claimant, who then requested renegotiations. However, the respondent refused
and terminated the contract. The claimant sued the respondent, arguing that the termination
of the contract was illegal based on art. 1134.2 of the French Civil Code. The claimant
251
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argued that the parties had a duty to renegotiate in good faith due to the fundamental
alteration of the equilibrium of the contract.
Even though the force majeure did not provide for economic imbalance based on
the increase in the processing of the placentae, the arbitral tribunal indicated that the parties
did not expect that the governmental agency would require these new processes for the
placentae that increased its price. Also, the tribunal, based on the applicable law, held that
the parties had a duty to renegotiate that cannot be eliminated by a contractual provision.
Furthermore, the tribunal indicated that the parties had a duty to renegotiate, but this does
not mean that the claimant had the right to impose a new price that the respondent would
be obligated to accept.
In the French jurisprudence, the courts established that in cases of hardship, there
was a duty of good faith to renegotiate between the contracting parties. This jurisprudence
evolved and became loi de la République in 2016 when reforms were made to the
Napoleonic Code of 1804.
With this reform, France decided to follow the elements and consequences of
hardship present in the UNIDROIT Principles, indicating in art. 1195 that in cases of
unforeseeable circumstances that make the contract excessively onerous, the parties have
a duty to renegotiate. If the disadvantaged party accepted the risk of the event under the
contract, it does not have the right to request for renegotiations or adaptation.
During the renegotiations, the disadvantaged party had to keep performing its
obligation. If renegotiations do not produce any outcome, either party may request the
tribunal terminate or adapt the contract. Thus, the remedy of adaptation is now available in
French law and can be granted without an express authorization of the tribunal to adapt the
contract. It is no longer an extraordinary remedy. The requirements to request adaptation
are: (1) hardship, and (2) the parties held renegotiations.
Therefore, this change of perspective from one of the most conservative law
systems, where the principle pacta sunt servanda was applied as the golden rule, now has
innovated its approach to allow adaptation in cases of hardship.

ii. Belgium
Belgium follows the principle of pacta sunt servanda in private contracts. It
provides for imprévision only in cases of administrative law. Therefore, the Belgium courts
do not adapt the contracts without an express conferral of power.
In the case of unforeseeable events that make the contract excessively onerous, the
remedy is renegotiation in good faith to deal with the new situation, but the courts do not
intervene in the autonomy of the parties or their agreements. In this regard, probably the
most renowned case dealing with situations of hardship is the Scafom case,254 decided in
the Cour d´Cassation of Belgium in 2009. The court, applying the Convention of
International Sale of Goods (CISG), found hardship and that art. 79 of the CISG has a gap
for the remedy in cases of hardship that needs to be filled by the mechanism of art. 7 (2) of
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the CISG, which means that the gaps of the Convention needs to be filled by its
international principles. These principles guide the uniform application of the UNIDROIT
Principles, which in art. 6.2.3. provide for renegotiation as the remedy in cases of hardship.
In this case, Scafom International (Dutch buyer) vs. Lorraine Tubes (French
seller),255 the parties had an agreement for supplying steel tubes. Years later, due to
unforeseen market fluctuations, the price of the steel tubes increased approximately 70%.
The seller proposed renegotiations, but the buyer refused and expressed that the seller had
to perform according to the original agreement. The seller refused to perform, and the buyer
sued for breach of contract. The trial court indicated that the CISG only deals with situation
of force majeure and not hardship, and therefore, could not adapt the contract. Ultimately,
the court increased the price of the contract by half after the proceedings.
The buyer appealed, and the court of appeals indicated that CISG had a gap
regarding hardship that need to be filled by the rules of private international law. The court
determined that the applicable law was French law, sent the parties for renegotiations, and
granted the seller 450,000 euros as damages because the proposal of the seller was
reasonable.
Then, the Cour de Cassation indicated that the applicable law was the CISG, which
deals with situations of hardship in art. 79 and has a gap for the remedy that needed to be
filled by the UNIDROIT Principles, sending the parties to renegotiations.
e. Spain 256
Contrary to other civil codes, such as the Panamanian Civil Code and the Italian
Civil code, Spain does not have an express provision in its civil code addressing the
grounds or consequences of excessive onerousness. During the years 1940 to 1990 the
application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus in Spain was not common. However, an
evolution in the case law that addressed this principle occurred from 1991 to 2012.257
In the ICC case No. 8873 decided in 1997,258 involving a French consortium
(plaintiff) and Algerian entity (respondent) for the construction of a road in Algeria. The
applicable law to the dispute was Spanish law. The plaintiff was delayed in finishing the
project, and the respondent requested liquidated damages for the delay. The plaintiff
brought this arbitration requesting the following: first, compensation for the overruns it
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suffered during the project, based on hardship; second, that it suffered force majeure that
produced the delay in the project due to insecurity in Algeria, difficulties of transit in the
national roads, difficulty in the supply of asphalt, other climate events that impacted the
works, defective use of the road, and violation by the respondent in its obligation to assist
and to cooperate.
In the first issue, the plaintiff argued that the trade usages in the international
contracts were applicable to the dispute, in addition to the applicable law. The arbitral
tribunal determined that based on the ICC Rules the arbitral tribunal must take into
consideration the stipulations of the contract and the usages of commerce. The tribunal
indicated that the usages of a certain industry in the international commerce are considered
applicable without an express reference, because it is obligatory as a consequence of an
usage repeated and widespread. But it had to take it into consideration with caution to avoid
adding terms to the contract that the parties did not reasonably consider applicable.
The plaintiff argued that the UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts were
applicable as trade usage. The tribunal indicated that in the international practice the
obligation to restore the equilibrium of the contract (first by renegotiations and then, the
possibility to request adaptation, as provided by art. 6.2.3.(4), of the UNIDROIT
Principles) constituted an exceptional principle that has not been accepted in the frame of
the hardship clauses, which need to provide the causes and the consequences of the
hardship. Therefore, the considerations of hardship of the UNIDROIT Principles cannot be
considered as trade usage.
The plaintiff also argued under the trade usage conditions of FIDIC and ENAA the
costs paid by the contractor in consequence of a situation of force majeure should be
reimbursed by the employer. However, the tribunal also rejected this argument indicating
that FIDIC and ENAA have specified different procedures in the case of force majeure
situations and these separate regulations cannot be applied by default and out of context,
because they require the negotiations of several complementary elements.
About the issue of the contractor’s responsibility in the delays, the tribunal found
the force majeure that the parties agreed to only provided the elements of unavoidability
and no control of the parties. The force majeure clause provided that the affected party
shall give notice and details of the force majeure circumstances in writing to the other party
as promptly as possible after its occurrence. The tribunal indicated that this notification
provision has to be taken into consideration with flexibility because that would mean that
no communication, except in a specific manner, could be taken into account. The
respondent argued that the risk of the events was a burden of the plaintiff because it was
already delayed in the fulfillment of its obligation to finish the project. This argument was
based on art. 1096 (3) of the Spanish Civil Code, which indicates that if the debtor is
delayed in its obligation (in this situation of giving notice to the employer) it bears the risk.
The plaintiff argued that this provision only applied to obligations to give something. In
this issue, the tribunal indicated that there was no proof that this provision applied to
construction contracts and that its application would not be justified.
In an interesting approach to the specificity of international contracts, the tribunal
established that through the contract the parties showed their implicit intent to exclude the
application of dispositive rules of the national applicable law which do not correspondent
to the international practice, as art. 1096 (3) of the Spanish Civil Code. Therefore, the
circumstances of force majeure that arose after the project had to be done could be taken
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into consideration. The tribunal found two situations to be considered force majeure that
justified the delay of the delivery of the project: the closing of the roads and the problem
with the supply of the asphalt, with justified delays of 15 days and 20 days respectively,
which reduced the liquidated damages for the delayed of the project.
In this case, the plaintiff not only requested a reduction of the liquidated damages
due to the justified delays (arguing hardship or rebus sic stantibus), but also requested
reimbursement of the overruns expended as consequences of the force majeure events. As
mentioned above, the tribunal rejected art. 6.2.3. of UNIDROIT Principles addressing the
remedies of hardship as applicable as trade usages. The tribunal also indicated that because
this principle was not in the contract or in the Spanish law, hardship was not applicable in
the case.
However, the tribunal did recognize that rebus sic stantibus due to external
circumstances that affected the equilibrium of the contract, was present in the Spanish law.
Citing judgments of the Supreme Court of Spain that indicated a judge may restore the
equilibrium of the contract if the following elements were met: (1) an extraordinary
alteration of the economic circumstances different from the moment of the conclusion of
the contract and the moment of performance, (2) an extraordinary disproportion of the
obligation of the parties that destroyed the preexistent equilibrium, (3) that the situations
were unforeseeable. Nevertheless, the tribunal indicated that the circumstances alleged by
the plaintiff did not meet these requirements, and rebus sic stantibus was not applicable to
grant plaintiff the reimbursement of the overruns.
In the twenty-first century, the Spanish case law perspective about hardship
changed mostly due to the economic crisis in 2008.259 In this regard, in lack of a provision
in the Spanish Civil Code the courts adapted to the economic circumstances of the moment
by recognizing adaptation as a remedy to preserve the contracts between the parties where
unforeseeable circumstances affected the economic essence of the contract.
The landmark case where the Supreme Court of Spain (“Tribunal Supremo”)
addressed and recognized the principle of hardship was the Promedios case (STS
2823/2014).260 A publicity company called Promedios Exclusivas de Publicidad, SL
(plaintiff) had a contract with the transportation company of the city of Valencia, Empresa
Municipal de Transportes de Valencia (respondent). In 2006 the parties concluded a
contract where Promedios had to pay Empresa for the space of publicity with a minimum
amount of 178,350 euros per month upgradeable up to 5%.
In 2009 plaintiff informed respondent of its offer to temporally pay 70% of the
previous canon due to the unforeseeable change in circumstances in the investment in the
advertisement market, which in 2007 decreased by 21.74% and by 2009 decreased 33.3%.
Promedios had to close that line of business to save the other areas of business of the
company.
Promedios sued Empresa in the trial court requesting adaptation of the contract due
to the economic crisis. The trial court ruled in favor of Promedios and adapted the contract
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where from November 2008, the monthly payment was going to be 70% of the income of
Promedios or 70,000 euros per month. Empresa appealed and the court of appeals reversed
the judgment, ruling that Promedios had to pay Empresa for damages. The case went to
cassation to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Empresa, reversing the judgment of the court
of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which applied hardship to adapt the
contract. In this regard, the Supreme Court indicated that the Spanish jurisprudence
established that the equitable notion of the principle of rebus sic stantibus must be changed
to an objective notion that does not contradict with the principle of pacta sunt servanda
and the stability of the conditions of the contract. The new concept of rebus sic stantibus
will have an objective notion based on principles of the Spanish codified system, such as
equilibrium of the contracts (art. 1289 of the Spanish Civil Code) and good faith (art. 1258
of the Spanish Civil Code).
Regarding the consequence or the remedy in case of hardship, the court established
that based on the principle of conservation of contracts, the hardship may produce an
adaptation of the agreement to restore the equilibrium of the contract and not necessarily
the termination of the contract.
The court indicated a three-prong test to be able to determine if the objective basis
of the contract was destroyed by the change of circumstances. The three elements of the
test are cause, purpose of the contract, and risk allocation. First, the event must cause the
impact of the new event, in consideration of the conditions that the parties had at the
moment of the conclusion of the contract. Second, there must be an alteration in the purpose
of the contract. For this element the court indicated that two factors must be met: (a) The
main economic purpose of the contract, expressly provided or derived from the essence of
it, is frustrated or becomes unattainable; and (b) the equivalence of the contract, between
the consideration of the parties, disappears, destroying the basis of quid pro quo of the
agreement. Finally, the risk allocation agreed to by the parties must be part of the
consideration of the tribunal. If the parties did not agree to a specific risk allocation, then
the event cannot be a hardship if it is part of the normal risks of the type of contract.
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that in cases of hardship, the parties may require the
tribunal to adapt the contract if renegotiation by the parties did not produce any outcome.
By jurisprudence, the hardship is a default provision in contracts that are governed by the
Spanish law.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Once upon a time, a philosopher said: “the only thing that is constant is change.”
The history of the Panama Canal is the perfect example of this statement. Since its
construction, the people who wanted to be involved in this project have faced the hardest
challenges and the most unexpected changes. From the genius of De Lesseps negotiating
with the Colombians and the failure of his Canal a niveau, passing through the American
desire to connect the world through a Canal and the concurrent independence of a country.
The subsequent change of command from the experienced American administration to the
hands of the fervent and entrepreneurial Panamanians, to the Panamanian project of
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expansion. As in the construction of the Canal, the expansion also had dreams, extreme
difficulties and unforeseeable changes.
When the parties are involved in international business, the freedom of contract
grants the chance to negotiate and choose their rights and obligations in the occurrence of
material changes. In this choice, there is a presumption that the parties involved in
international business are sophisticated and at least reasonable. Thus, the freedom of
contract grants a right, but also a duty to be coherent in the choice of the agreement by
selecting the text of the contract and the applicable law. Therefore, by these choices the
parties agree and are bound by their consequences.
If the parties intend to maintain the equilibrium of the contract in cases of certain
changes, having due regard to the economic situations of both parties, they should include
a hardship clause with the correct remedy. When the tribunals determine if there is hardship
for one party, they have to analyze on a case-by-case basis, with due regard to the economic
circumstances of both parties.
If the parties try to include all the situations that may happen, the contracts would
be infinite. It is true that the parties cannot foresee all the changes that may occur. This is
the reason why the selection of the applicable law is fundamental, because it will
supplement what the parties did not take into account. In this regard, because of the variety
of approaches that different legal systems have in interpreting the contracts, the level of
supplementation of the agreements with the applicable law, and the different ways that the
legal systems deal with the consequences of economic disequilibrium due to unforeseen or
unforeseeable changes, the parties must choose carefully when selecting an applicable law
that best suits their will on how to deal with subsequent changes. The only usage in cases
of economic impossibility is the duty of good faith, that is more a duty to be ethical and a
reasonable businessperson, which has been recognized in the international business
community as the obligation that each party has to listen to the arguments and the position
of the disadvantaged party to reach a joint solution. In the duty of good faith, the parties
are not obligated to reach a solution. The reason why the international parties make
contracts is to have certainty and predictability in the constantly changing world.
In cases of failed renegotiations, there is no international usage on the remedy of
adaptation in cases of hardship. Finally, because the parties come from different legal
systems, it is fundamental to select the remedy in cases of hardship in the contract and to
select the applicable law for the contract to ensure a remedy in cases of failed
renegotiations.
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